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ABSTRACT
THE STUDY OF MOTIVATION FOR DEFECTION WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY: HINDERING THE GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO PREVENT AND
DETECT DEFECTION
William Virgili
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

Since its inception, the global community has been marred by insecurities about the
intentions of other states, which led to states creating intelligence agencies to engage in human
intelligence operations. In defense against foreign intelligence services, the U.S. has
implemented policies and procedures, informed by defection research, to prevent and detect
defection. However, this leads to the question does current research on motivation for defection
adequately inform government policies and procedures to prevent and detect defection within the
intelligence community? To interrogate this question, I present an in-depth analysis of
motivation; the ways in which these conclusions have or have not been applied in defection
studies; and current ways the government prevents and detects defection. Utilizing an
understanding of these components, I present five case studies that demonstrate defection studies
failure are unable to explain motivation, absent the incorporation of theoretical assistance from
psychologists, sociologists, or social psychologists. In concluding, I assess that those studying
motivation for defection within the intelligence community have not been studying motivation
for defection, but ways in which to assist intelligence officers in eliciting defection from an
individual. This focus, while advantageous for the intelligence community, fails to adequately
inform the U.S. government in support their prevention and detection of defection. Faced with

this failure, I bring forward two proposals that would enhance the government’s understanding of
motivation for defection and the development of effective policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the modern “state” there has been significant theoretical
discussion about the implications and potential for interstate conflict and cooperation.
Disagreements among scholars and practitioners within international relations have led to a
variety of theories that range from the belief that war is omnipresent to the belief in the potential
for a utopian global government; however, one consistent theme throughout all theories is
uncertainty.1 A few examples include the uncertainty of whether a state will act in their own
interest, the global good, or a combination of both; the military capabilities of another; or the
political, economic, or military intentions of an opposition. These uncertainties have led states to
seek out ways to better understand its competitors, leading to the establishment of intelligence
agencies. In the United States (U.S.), the intelligence community (a general term for the
collection of U.S. intelligence agencies) has been tasked with the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information about other states, with other states also establishing similar
intelligence structures. As Chapter 2 further explains, these intelligence agencies play an
indispensable role in national and international security.
While states make up the structure of the international community, states are made of
institutions, and these institutions are composed of people. The following paper looks at this
most fundamental component of a state, the person. In focusing on the individual, the following
paper evaluates a fundamental aspect of human intelligence (HUMINT), any intelligence that is

1

Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, “An Introduction to Security Studies,” in Security Studies:
An Introduction, ed. Paul Williams and Matt McDonald (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1-14.
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received from a person,2 defection. Defection, the act of an individual giving classified
information to another government, poses a significant risk to national security. To defend
against this, governments have turned to their respective intelligence communities to establish
and implement policies that are informed by research, leading the following paper to attempt to
answer the question of does current research on motivation for defection adequately inform
government procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community?
To answer this question, this paper focuses on understanding the development of
motivational theory; the failure of those applying motivational studies to defection research; and
the way in which research focusing on defection has informed (or failed to inform) government
procedures to prevent and detect defection. To do this, I first demonstrate the indispensable role
that intelligence agencies play in promoting national and international security; that without
HUMINT, states would fail to truly understand the intentions of other states; and that an
understanding of motivation and defection are imperative in collecting HUMINT. In Chapter 3, I
discuss the theoretical frameworks that have shaped an academic understanding of motivation;
the work of practitioners focusing on defection within the intelligence community; and current
governmental efforts at preventing and detecting defection within the intelligence community. In
Chapter 4, I demonstrate the viability of the conclusions of the theoretical and applied research
by evaluating five case studies. In evaluating these case studies, I also look at how the
government’s understanding of motivation and the procedures failed (or succeeded) in
preventing and/or detecting defection. Chapter 5 goes on to assess that research focusing on

2

Central Intelligence Agency, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence,” News & Information, last
modified April 30, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010featured-story-archive/intelligence-human-intelligence.html.
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applying motivational research to defection has failed to actually investigate motivation, thus
leading to uninformed government procedures.
In closing, I conclude that those applying motivation theory to defection fail to address
the motivation of an individual, instead focusing on ways to leverage superficial “symptoms” of
motivation as a tool to be exploited by intelligence officers. I also postulate that this failure has
inadequately informed the government about ways to prevent and detect defection. In taking this
approach, this paper sets out to establish ways to better study motivation for defection, further
securing U.S.’ national security and adequately informing government policies.
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CHAPTER 2
REASONS FOR STUDY
To adequately create a case for the studying of intelligence agencies, the following
chapter is broken down into four sections, the first two sections discuss National and
International Security, focusing on the defined threats within the given spheres and the role that
the intelligence community plays in mitigating those threats in their support of promoting
national and international security. The third section, HUMINT Sources, focuses on a particular
type of intelligence source, the benefits of accessing this type of intelligence source, and the
continued prevalence that HUMINT will play in the future. The final section of this chapter,
Study of Motivation for Defection, discusses the act of a HUMINT source turning from their
country to a foreign adversary, leading to the view that it is imperative to fully understand
defection and the contributing factors, leading to effectively development procedures to prevent
and detect it.

National Security
When looking to interstate relations, one component must be present for a state to persist
in the international community, survival. There is a pervasive argument within international
studies to the ways in which a state can ensure its survival, posing questions such as, “Can states
cooperate to promote a collective security?” and “To what degree does relative power play in a
state’s decision-making process?” However, one observation is evident, if the state does not
exist, we are unable to talk about the state and its functions. Therefore, the following section
takes a look at the various threats to a state’s national security and how intelligence, and the
intelligence community as a whole, promotes national security.

5
The United States (U.S.), through diplomatic, international trade agreements, economic
advantage, and military force has become a world super power and comes with the consequence
of being exposed to numerous threats as noted in Robert Kagan’s “Power and Weakness”. He
claims that through the predominance as a military force, the U.S. has positioned itself to be
threatened by a variety of actors around the world.3 These threats include competing interests
with rival states; numerous terrorist threats and organizations, both domestic and international;
and the potential for cyber-attacks on the U.S. These threats are outlined in depth in the National
Security Strategy (NSS),4 a document released by the President of the United States since 1987
outlining the most prevalent security threats around the world to U.S. national security.
However, even prior to development of the NSS, the U.S. faced national and international
threats, leading to the development and refining of seventeen intelligence agencies.5 These
agencies have a variety of jobs including, but not limited to: collecting and analyzing
information from publicly available information (Open Source Intelligence); gathering and
analyzing data on physical structures around the world determining their function and purpose
(Geospatial Intelligence);6 and gathering information about the structure, military capabilities, or
other information about another country through human sources via covert collection
(HUMINT).7 In executing their responsibilities, the U.S intelligence agencies “defend against

3

Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, no. 113 (June & July 2002): 3-28.
Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington
DC: Government Printing Office, 2017).
5
Nina, Agrawal, “There's more than the CIA and FBI: The 17 agencies that make up the U.S.
intelligence community,” L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-17intelligence-agencies-20170112-story.html.
6
National Geospatial Agency, “About the NGA,” accessed September 16, 2017,
https://www.nga.mil/About/Pages/Default.aspx.
7
Central Intelligence Agency, “Human Intelligence,” Offices of CIA, last modified August 03,
2016, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/intelligence.html.
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and mitigate threat actors operating below the threshold of open conflict” through the collection
and defense of national and international secrets and to provide the President, U.S. policymakers,
and other consumers (decision makers within the government) timely and accurate intelligence to
allow them to make effective decisions.8 The following section looks at the role that U.S.
intelligence agencies play in defending the U.S. from the competing interests with rival states
and against domestic and international terrorist threats.
Competing Interests with Rival States
As outlined in the 2017 NSS, one predominant threat that the U.S. faces is competing
state interests, which include but are not limited to the security of the state against weapon
systems and military force of a competitor and the knowledge of current and future operations of
the opponent to disrupt the rival’s economic or political situation. 9 While there are other
interests of the state as defined by other political scientists and theorists, a focus on these threats
demonstrate the prevalence and importance that the intelligence agencies have played in assisting
the U.S. in defending its national security.
One primary aspect of interstate competition focuses on weapon capability inequality.
Within this realm, there are numerous instances in which intelligence has played a vital role in
providing policy makers with objective information to better inform their decisions. One such
instance is revealed in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where the U.S. determined that the
Soviet Union (USSR) moved nuclear missiles to Cuba during the Cold War. At the time these
missiles posed a threat because the U.S. perceived that these missiles had were more capable

8

Trump, “National Security Strategy,” 2017; and Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Vision,
Mission, Ethos & Challenges,” About the CIA, last modified March 24, 2016,
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values; Defense Intelligence Agency, “About
the DIA,” Accessed October 7, 2018, http://www.dia.mil/About/.
9
Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
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than the U.S.’ This misperception has become known as the “missile gap”. To avert a potentially
volatile situation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) effectively ran Oleg Penkovsky as an
informant, an intelligence asset who relayed information about the USSR missile operating
systems,10 allowing President Kennedy to make an informed decision on how to progress to
diffuse the situation. A second way in which intelligence agencies contribute to national security
is through the evaluation of military force and capabilities of a rival state. One key example that
shows the prevalence of the intelligence community’s work is in the case of Dmitri Polyakov. As
a GRU colonel, Polyakov fed the CIA information on Chinese and Vietnamese forces, giving the
U.S. access to classified information on the enemy forces and their movements.11 While his work
did not necessarily reveal inequalities within the battlefield, it allowed the U.S. an advantage by
knowing that the Chinese and Vietnamese troops had the ability to muster against U.S. troops.
A second concern that rival states pose to national security could be categorized as
economic or political threats. One example of an economic threat, discussed by John Brockmiller
in his article “Psywar in Intelligence Operations,” depicts the advantage that a state would have
if they recognize a shift in the economy of their rival from the development of military
equipment to that of consumer goods.12 In this scenario, a rival country, with this information,
would be able to have a more holistic picture of the other’s actions and would be able to adjust
one’s policy to readily be able to counter the new economic market that would be emerging as a
result of the production shift. Intelligence agencies also play a critical role in identifying,

10

Norman Polmar, and Thomas Allen, Spy Book: the Encyclopedia of espionage (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1997).
11
Richard Trahair and Robert Miller, Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret
Operations (Enigma Books, 2012).
12
John Brockmiller. “Psywar in Intelligence Operations,” Studies of Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Sept.
1961): 49-55.
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addressing, and responding to political threats from a rival state. A prime example is in their
involvement in the case of the Russian disinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election. The U.S. intelligence community gathered and evaluated evidence
surrounding the claims of Russian involvement; contributed to the educating of policy makers on
the conclusions of the investigation; their investigation and interaction with policy makers
directly contributed to the implementation of sanctions against Russia.13 While this is a more
immediate example of intelligence agencies’ involvement in political defense of U.S. national
security, it shows the attempts of rival states to influence domestic affairs of the U.S.
Detection and Protection Against Terrorist Threats
In another prominent component in the 2017 NSS, the president identified the use of
intelligence sources to continue to successfully rout out domestic and international terrorists.14
While terrorism has remained a contested definition within the security field, the U.S. Patriot Act
defines domestic terrorism as “an attempt to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”15 In concurrence with the vision
of the NSS, the Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, in “The Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” deems homegrown violent extremists (HVEs)

13

Karen Yourish and Troy Griggs, “8 U.S. Intelligence Groups Blame Russia for Meddling, but
Trump Keeps Clouding the Picture,” The New York Times, August 2, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/16/us/elections/russian-interference-statementscomments.html; Conor Finnegan, Jordyn Phelps, and Arlette Saenz, “Trump administration
sanctions Russians for 2016 election interference, other cyber attacks,” ABC News, March 15,
2018, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-administration-sanctions-russia-2016-electioninterference-cyber/story?id=53768648.
14
Trump, National Security Strategy,” 2017.
15
Greg Myre, “What Is, And Isn’t, Considered Domestic Terrorism,” NPR, October 2, 2017,
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/02/555170250/what-is-and-isnt-considered-domestic-terrorism.
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as the primary domestic terrorist threat to national security.16 These are individuals that are
influenced by, and sometimes aided by, foreign extremist organizations to carry out attacks on
U.S. soil. One recently declassified case of combatting HVE’s is the British Secret Intelligence
Service’s (MI6) running of a HUMINT source inside al-Qaeda (AQ). In the book Nine Lives: My
time as the West’s top spy inside al-Qaeda, Aimen Dean describes his life inside AQ as an
informant for MI6, where he spent a majority of his time passing information on AQ’s attempts
to influence nationals to carry out attacks on British and American soil.17 Dean’s account of his
support for MI6 and the U.S. intelligence community demonstrates that the vital intelligence that
he provided to his handlers prevented what would have been a number of successful terrorist
attacks targeting the UK.
The previous section focused on two primary threats to national security: 1) competing
interests of rival states and 2) the detection and prevention of terrorist threats, providing
examples of a variety of cases and operations involving intelligence agencies and the impact that
those cases and operations have had in promoting national security. It also demonstrated that
without the use of intelligence in the promotion of national security, policy makers would be
unable to make informed decisions in the face of a national (or international) crisis situation.

16

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, The Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, by Daniel Coats, (2018),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---UnclassifiedSSCI.pdf.
17
Aimen Dean, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister, Nine Lives: My time as the West’s top spy
inside al-Qaeda (Oneworld Publications, 2018).
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International Security
As previously iterated, without an international community there would be no structure
for states to interact in, which could lead to multiple outcomes. Therefore, maintaining this
structure is critical to international security. This paper defines international security as “the
preservation of the norms, rules, institutions, and value of international society” to distinguish
international security from national security. 18 Looking at international security through Samuel
Makinda’s definition allows me to use a broad brush when looking into the impact of
intelligence activities on international security, while limiting the operationalizing of
international security to situations (or actors) that would compromise the foundational integrity
of global society as a whole.19 However, Bill McSweeney, in Security, Identity and Interests: A
Sociology of International Relations, identifies an increased interconnectivity of the security
interests of states and the difficulty to address one absent consideration for the security interests
of others.20 This therefore leads to the observation that states classify differing situations or
actors as threats,21 a conversation beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus on the

18

Samuel Makinda, “Sovereignty and Global Security,” Sage Journals 29, no. 3 (September
1998): 281-292.
19
Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2018,” Arms
Control Association, last modified August 17, 2018,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity;
UNHCR, “Syria Emergency,” Emergencies, accessed October 20, 2018,
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html.
20
Bill McSweeny, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations
(Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21
Ted Hopf, “The logic of habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International
Relations 16, no. 4 (December 2010): 539-561; Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,”
International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 225-286; and Kagan, “Power and
Weakness,” 2002.
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ways in which intelligence agencies defend against military challenges and terrorism in the
promotion of international security.22
One of the most innate threat to one’s security is a physical threat, where, to a state in the
international community, the most obvious is another’s military. A primary example of
intelligence agencies’ role in protecting against military challenges is exemplified in the Cold
War. Unlike WW2 and the Gulf War, the intelligence activities run by the CIA against the USSR
were constant and diverse. The CIA used, as mentioned before, Oleg Penkovsky to gather
intelligence on USSR missile capabilities;23 the U-2 plane to gather imagery on USSR troop
movements;24 and numerous other HUMINT and SIGINT operations to gather extensive
knowledge on USSR capabilities and movement. In assessing the USSR military forces,
capabilities, and movements, the U.S. assisted the international community by protecting it from
the USSR (and ultimately Communism). While this was an example of how intelligence agencies
were successful in increasing international security, there are times in history that we have seen
times were intelligence activity has led to the destabilization of the international community. Due
to the inaccurate assessment of the CIA, regarding Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
capability, 25 the U.S. led a coalition effort to invade Iraq, spurring a war, and occupation lasting
until 2011.26 Both of these examples, one of successful intelligence operations, the other an

22

Vasantha Raghavan, "Challenges to Global Security," Pakistan Horizon 60, no. 3 (July 2007):
23-39; and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the US Intelligence Community, 2018.
23
Polmar and Allen, Spy Book: the Encyclopedia of espionage, 1997.
24
CIA, “Aerial Reconnaissance,” 2012.
25
CIA, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence.”
26
“The Iraq War,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 24, 2018,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.
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intelligence blunder, demonstrate the profound implications that intelligence intervention has on
international security.
Terrorism is a potent threat that is not constrained by borders and has shown to threaten
both poor and wealthy stats alike. Looking at international terrorism, defined as violent acts that
would violate the code of a state that are intended to influence civilians, government policy, or
the conduct of the government primarily outside the jurisdiction of the U.S.,27 demonstrates
intelligence agencies’ ability to respond to perceived crises. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were one
of these crises that shook the U.S. and international community. It was a primary catalyst in
increasing intelligence agencies’ counterterrorism ability and drastic legislative and executive
actions by the U.S., resulting in: the U.S. PATRIOT Act, which increased communication ability
between intelligence organizations;28 the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)29 and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),30 fundamental components
in defending, preventing, and responding to security threats; and an increase in funding for the
U.S. intelligence community.31 With its newly increased capabilities, the U.S. intelligence
community has led the Global War on Terror, conducting missions such as arming Syrian rebels

27

Cornell Law School, “18 U.S. Code §- Definitions,” U.S. Code, accessed October 27, 2018,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331.
28
Department of Justice, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” Highlights of
the USA PATRIOT Act, accessed October 27, 2018,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm.
29
Department of Homeland Security, “History,” About DHS, accessed October 27, 2018,
https://www.dhs.gov/history.
30
Gordon Lederman, “Restructuring the Intelligence Community,” Hoover Press, accessed
October 27, 2018, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817946624_65.pdf.
31
Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by
Micael DeVine, R44381 (2018).
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to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) (an international terrorist
organization, denying them a safe haven for their organization.32
By looking at intelligence agencies’ support for international security in countering
military challenges and terrorism, I have demonstrated their role as a guarantee of the
international community; their ability to address their customer’s needs (policy makers); and
their capacity to meet the world’s security demands.

Human Intelligence Sources
The U.S., in their pursuit of intelligence, uses a variety of sources, such as SIGINT,
HUMINT, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and open source collection. However, one primary
type of source that has a profound impact on intelligence gathering is a HUMINT source.
HUMINT is any information that comes from a human source (intelligence agents), such as a
scientist or foreign intelligence agency employee (intelligence officer).33 When looking at the
previous operations and the role that intelligence, specifically HUMINT, has played in mitigating
threats to national and international security it is vital to evaluate the specific function that it
currently holds within intelligence organizations, as well as its future in intelligence
communities. The three primary components of HUMINT addressed in the following section are
the actors involved, the way in which HUMINT is moved from a source to an intelligence
agency, and HUMINT’s current and future roles within the intelligence community.

32

John Walcott, “Trump ends CIA arms support for anti-Assad Syria rebels: U.S. officials,”
Reuters, July 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-syria/trump-endscia-arms-support-for-anti-assad-syria-rebels-u-s-officials-idUSKBN1A42KC.
33
CIA, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence,” 2013.
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Actors
The first actor identified is known as an intelligence officer. These are individuals
employed by an intelligence agency, such as the CIA, to assess, develop, recruit, and run
potential assets.34 The second critical actor within HUMINT operations is the asset or agent,
terms which are used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this work. An asset is an
individual that has been identified, targeted, and sought out by an intelligence officer because of
their access to protected information and their potential vulnerability to defection (defined and
discussed later in this chapter).35 While intelligence officers are employees of a given
intelligence agency, assets are affiliated with intelligence agencies because of their cooperation
with the foreign intelligence agency throughout the process of their defection, yet, are not agency
employees. Assets can include, but are not limited to, diplomats, scientists, and military
personnel. Another potentially valuable asset to a country is an intelligence officer from a
foreign agency. “Flipping” a foreign intelligence officer would give an intelligence agency a
direct line to information within the foreign agency and critical information within the foreign
government. While both actors are a vital component to HUMINT they vary in their roles, with
the officer being a government employee collecting information from an asset; and the asset, an
individual engaged in giving the information intended as a state secret for their country, to a
foreign intelligence officer.
Current and Future Roles of HUMINT
As previously noted, there are a variety of non-HUMINT collection methods that
intelligence agencies use to collect information on other countries, such as X number of missiles

34
35

Jack Devine, Good Hunting, ed. Vernon Loeb (New York: Picador, 2014).
Ibid.
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have moved. Sources of collection are always limited and therefore, an intelligence agency needs
to gather intelligence from multiple sources to be able to fully understand a situation, event, etc.
Many of the sources can provide the “what” to an opposition’s activities, however, fail to
provide the “why”. To fill in the gap of “why” for an opposition’s activity, intelligence agencies
turn to HUMINT.36 Without HUMINT, a government would be able to know what, where, and
when things are happening in another country but would lack a definitive understanding of the
intention behind the given action. Another role that HUMINT actors play is in protecting the
classified information they are privy to. An example can be found when looking to Aldrich
Ames, a case that will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4. After being compromised, Ames’
information led to the deaths of numerous intelligence agents run by the U.S. during the Cold
War and post-Cold War era.37 He failed to protect information entrusted to him by the CIA,
regarding the identity of assets being run by the CIA, which lead to their trials and execution. For
the reasons above, the CIA and the intelligence community closely protects their sources and
methods when carrying out intelligence operations.
The use of HUMINT dates back to the 1940’s during WW2 when the OSS (the CIA’s
predecessor) used HUMINT sources to gather information on Nazi positions to better support the
D-Day invasion.38 The Cold War is full of examples of the use of HUMINT sources for
information collection and protection. Today, the use of HUMINT sources continues, such as

36

Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1992).
James Adams, Sell Out (Viking Adult, 1995).
38
Central Intelligence Agency, “The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence
Agency,” library, last modified September 6, 2017,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/intelligence-history/oss.
37
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their use to counter rival state; in the case of China, aid their pursuit and theft of trade secrets;39
and in the defending against domestic and international terrorist threats.
HUMINT has proven invaluable in the past, however, technological advances, especially
in collection efforts within the cyber domain and developments in imagery intelligence (IMINT)
collection (including satellite imagery collection), call into question its continued use. While
there is an abundance of individuals calling for its fall, there are numerous supports that
recognize the continued utility of HUMINT. One main advocate of continued use of HUMINT
collections operations is the Deputy Director of the CIA, David Cohen. In a speech at Cornell
University, he discussed how the Director of the CIA, John Brennan (at the time), had proposed
a two-prong approach to the future of intelligence activities, in which HUMINT collection would
play an indispensable role because of the ability for it to explain what adversaries intended to do.
While acknowledging the importance of SIGINT and other forms of collection in revealing what
is happening in other countries, Cohen stresses that HUMINT sources can explain the “why” and
the overall “what” of the activities of other countries, organizations, and networks.40 A second
example of support for the continued use of HUMINT collection is less evident, however, can be
found in the hiring of positions for 35M (HUMINT collectors) in the U.S. Army, Operations
Officers (HUMINT collectors in the CIA), and other HUMINT related jobs in both the private
and public sectors. Cohen’s speech, focusing on the future importance HUMINT operations, and
the continual hiring push within the field of HUMINT demonstrates the prominent role that
HUMINT will continue to play in the future.
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HUMINT has shown its importance in the ability to fill in “intelligence gaps” prior to the
creation of the CIA, the U.S.’s first peace time intelligence agency. The growth, development,
and role of HUMINT during the Cold War solidified it as being a premier source of intelligence
and its current use in combating rival states, military challenges, and domestic and international
terrorism make it an indispensable source of information. Finally, the continued prevalence of
HUMINT operations to the intelligence community is evident in Deputy Director Cohen’s
speech focusing on the continued use of HUMINT to lead the CIA in the future and the
abundance of HUMINT opportunities within the public and private sector. 41 These components
make HUMINT a foundational component of intelligence communities’ to study and understand
to the fullest extent.

Study of Motivation for Defection
Building upon the actors outlined above, the following section continues to look at the
process of HUMINT by defining defection and motivation, iterates the importance of studying
these concepts, and the role they play in promoting national and international security.
Defection
The way in which assets give secret information from their country to a foreign
intelligence service (FIS) varies from being approached by an intelligence officer and asked to
work for a foreign intelligence agency, while others “walk-in” and volunteer their services to the
other country. In either case, it can be said that the intelligence source is defecting to the country
they are providing information to.
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Previously, Phillip Lutscher has defined defection as switching sides from the regime to
the rebellion,42 while Shahzeen operationalized it as the absence of fulfilling an action.43
Lutscher’s definition stood for the choice to go against one’s regime in favor of a rebellion,
while Shahzeen Attari’s definition meant that the individual deviated from the collective norm of
making a donation. Both definitions were applicable in their respective studies, however, neither
is applicable to the topic at hand. In the current study, the definition of defection will present
itself as an ideal of sorts. One source that defines defection in terms of this ideological
perspective is the Merriam-Webster dictionary. It defines defection as, “conscious abandonment
of allegiance or duty.”44 This definition, although general, would suffice as the foundation for an
operationalized concept of defection. It allows for the omission of “double agents”, those who
pretend to be willing to help their opposition but are really still working for their home agency,
from being classified as defectors. It also allows for the omission of those who unknowingly
present their opposition with information about their homeland. The above definition is broad
enough to include those who have been coerced, influenced, or manipulated, and voluntarily give
information to another country. Finally, the definition allows for the wide interpretation of duty
or allegiance. One’s duty could encompass the individual’s duty to keep the information they
have access to secret, while also allowing for the inclusion of those who engage in espionage to
betray their country (and ultimately their allegiance to it). This definition allows for a sufficient
scope of subjects, yet also limits the field to those who are aware of their actions (not necessarily
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the implications) and to those who are delivering information to another country with the
intention of supplying valuable information (as opposed to a double agent who supplies
sufficient evidence to support their cover). Therefore, the definition of defection used within the
following chapters is, “the conscious abandonment of allegiance or duty by an individual
operating within the intelligence community through the delivery of state secrets, or other acts of
espionage, to another state”.
With this operationalization of defection, the role that it plays in the intelligence process
becomes evident. Without defection, there would be no HUMINT. Without HUMINT, there
would be gaps within the information that a country has, the implications of which have already
been discussed at length. From this understanding, not only is defection an integral part of the
intelligence cycle, but it can be seen as a starting point for collection efforts. Therefore, if one
were to better understand defection, it would lead to increased efficiency within the intelligence
processes, increases in national and international security, and boosting a state’s ability to more
effectively prevent and detect defection.
Motivation
Defection, previously defined, can be seen as a key component to the producing
intelligence and in promoting national and international security. However, few, as this paper
later illustrates, gain access to classified information with the goal of defecting. Therefore,
another pertinent question becomes what leads an individual to defect. While the definition of
motivation and the greater implications of motivation will be discussed in a later chapter, an
explanation of its importance requires attention. To fully support intelligence collection there
needs to be a deep understanding of defection, yet the question of what leads an individual to
defect is just as important. Therefore, it is imperative to study the motivation that leads to
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defection, because like the intelligence gap that would exist without the utilization of HUMINT,
there would be a gap in the understanding of defection if one failed to study its root causes,
referred to here as motivation.
The previous chapter, broken into four sections, outlined the importance of what will be
discussed in the following chapters. It demonstrated the vital role that intelligence plays in
support of national and international security, discussing the various threats posed to a state and
the international community and the ways intelligence agencies aid in combating them. It also
focused on the characteristics, components of, and utility of HUMINT in pursuit of
understanding the opposition. In all, the previous chapter has laid out two arguments: 1) Without
the intelligence community, national and international security would be greatly compromised
and 2) Failing to fully understand every component of HUMINT, including the role it plays in
the intelligence community, the actors involved, motivation, and defection, would hinder a
state’s ability to effectively counter national and international threats. All of these components
lead to the same conclusion that many other authors, theorists, and practitioners have come to;
the study of motivation and defection are important.
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CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION
One key party, that is interested in understanding defection and its motivators, is the
government that is being targeted by a FIS (virtually all governments within the international
community). Their interest, in fully understanding the components of HUMINT and what leads
to defection, stems from the need to prevent and (in worst case scenario) detect defection. The
ability of a government to enact effective policies is contingent upon the expansiveness and
validity of the information on a given subject. Therefore, to better understand whether current
studies on motivation for defection within the intelligence community appropriately inform
government policy, I delve into a variety of theoretical and practical applications of motivation
studies. Within this chapter, I first present an analysis of previous theoretical literature around
motivation within three fields of study: psychology, sociology, and social psychology,
demonstrating the complexity and continued developments of motivational theory. The second
section focuses on current efforts to studying motivation for defection within the intelligence
community, attempting to utilize established theory. The chapter concludes with a breakdown of
current efforts by the U.S. government to counter defection within the intelligence community by
focusing on the pre-employment screening and selection process; opportunities, preventative
action, and support services during employment that attempt to address identified factors that
could potentially lead to defection; and post-employment services, separation, and preventative
actions. Chapter 3 will not address the adequacy of the study of motivation for defection within
the intelligence community, nor will it address its ability to inform current efforts in preventing
defection. Focusing solely on understanding motivation from a theoretical perspective and in an
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applied manner will allow me to effectively apply the information in the case studies, presented
in Chapter 3.

Theoretical Approaches to Motivational Studies
While motivation has been of interest to intelligence agencies to leverage information to
aid in their activities, the development of theories of motivation predates the use of HUMINT.
There are three predominant scientific approaches to motivation that have been developed and
continually expanded upon: psychological, sociological, and social psychological. The
psychological approach sets motivational theory within the context of the internal processes of
the brain, focusing primarily on the individual and their cognitive processes. In contrast to the
psychological approach, the sociological perspective stems from Emile Durkheim’s work on
social norms to determine how society functions through interactions among individuals
according to “norms”.45 The final theoretical approach, social psychological, takes aspects of
both psychological and sociological motivational theory by proposing that an individual’s
motivation is determined by the interaction of their cognitive processes and societal factors.
Psychology
Psychology is the study of the relationship between the brain, the behavior of an
individual, and their environment,46 with a heavy focus on the individual and their behavior
through cognitive functions. While psychology has its origins in the lab of Wilhelm Wundt, who
focused on developing structuralism,47 it has experienced developments in technology; the
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incorporation of other scientific knowledge into their field of study; and paradigm shifts, that
have contributed to its development and evolution.48
The idea of structuralism, emerging from the work of Wilhelm Wundt, established
psychology as a science through attempts to map the structure of human consciousness.49 These
attempts were quickly overshadowed by motivation theory. William James’ theory of
fundamentalism quickly preceded Wundt and structuralism, proposing that humans act out of
their innate behaviors such as crying, love, sympathy, and fear of dark (some of the list was later
proven learned behavior) yet interact with and are shaped by daily behaviors called habits.50 One
difficulty that William’s theory posed was the exclusion of the idea of human consciousness.
Sigmund Freud soon became the predominant theorist with what has become known as
psychoanalysis. This motivational theoretical perspective concluded that the id, ego, and super
ego, through creating internal conflict, ultimately determine the motivation for one’s actions.51
Freud’s theory built upon his predecessors by postulating that an individual’s innate behaviors
(id) were continually being moderated for socially acceptable behavior (ego), while both were
placed within an internal moral framework (superego).
These previous practitioners were focused on the internal processes of an individual, at
the time, were unable to be quantified. This led to John Watson to seek to control and manipulate
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behavior by studying it “objectively”, giving birth to behaviorism.52 To better understand
motivation and what drives behavior, Watson focused on classical conditioning, observations
aimed at eliciting a reaction of the respondent to a neutral stimulus. Watson’s infamous “Little
Albert”, where he instilled fear in a child by showing him a white rat paired with a loud clang,53
best exemplifies this concept. Adding to this work, B.F. Skinner introduced the ideas of positive
and negative reinforcement. In his “Skinner Box” experiments, a rat was rewarded with food if it
pressed a lever (positive reinforcement), while in a separate experiment, if the rat pressed a lever
it would turn an administered shock off (negative reinforcement.54 Behaviorists, in essence,
studied animals’ most foundational motivators, instincts, yet, their work also introduced a
component of consciousness.
This component of consciousness is expanded upon by Albert Bandura, who developed
Social Learning Theory. Bandura’s prominent experiment involved children watching a video of
adults acting out certain actions on a Bobo Doll, which the children, after viewing, would
recreate aggression (or passivity) towards the doll when exposed to that variable.55 His
observations led to the proposition of a three-pronged system for learning and behavior. The first
aspect was the stimuli, when it happened, how it was presented, and in what context it occurred.
The more similar the subject identified with the situation in which the stimuli occurred, the more
likely it was to be replicated. The second component is the feedback (reward, punishment, or
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other type of reinforcement) given for the learned action. If an action had more positive
feedback, it was more likely to be replicated. And third, the internal cognitive functions of the
individual would lend the individual to act in a particular manner (based off previous
experiences, memories, etc.).56 Bandura’s proposal led to a blossoming in psychology’s
understanding of motivation and behavior; that an individual is driven to act because of an
interaction of their mental processes that have been shaped by learned behaviors over time with
the current stimuli presented to them at a given moment.
Bandura’s theory, in conjunction with significant neuro-imaging and mapping
technological advancements, 57 led to the development of the positivist approach. This approach
seeks to make the lives of individuals better through developing an understanding of oneself.58
One critical contribution by positivists, towards motivation, is a deeper understanding of mental
disorders. In support of understanding these disorders, psychologists created the DSM (the tool
used to determine whether a patient has a disorder and the severity of that disorder), which
discusses the symptomology and effects of a given disorder. Identified disorders include
disorders that can be mitigated by therapy and medication, such as general anxiety disorder, 59 to

56

Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977).
Robert Thatcher, Reid Lyon, J. Ramsey, N. Krasnegor, Developmental neuroimaging:
Mapping the development of brain and behavior (San Diego, Academic Press, 1996); and David
Yaden, Johannes Eichstaedt, and John Medaglia, “The Future of Technology in Positive
Psychology: Methodological Advances in the Science of Well-Being,” Frontiers in Psychology
9, no.1 (2018).
58
Michal Gelfin, Ada Zohar, and Lilac Lev-Ari, “Personality Change and Therapeutic Gain:
Randomized Controlled Trial of a Positive Psychology Intervention,” International Journal of
Psychology & Psychological Therapy 18, no. 2 (June 2018): 193-205; Emily Holmes, Dyfrig
Hughes, and Valerie Morrison, “Predicting Adherence to Medications Using Health Psychology
Theories: A Systematic Review of 20 Years of Empirical Research,” Value in Health 17, no. 8
(Dec. 2014): 863-876.
59
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Psychological
Disorders, 5th Edition: DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013), 222.

57

26
disorders that prevent an individual from living a “normal” life, such as schizophrenia. 60 In all,
the contributions brought forward by positivists bring a psychological focus to motivational
research by determining that an individual’s mental state plays a critical role in determining an
individual’s behavioral pattern.
While the previous analysis focused on a few of psychology’s contributions to literature
on motivation, it is in no way a complete record of the contributions of the field. Yet, even in its
brief account, this section has demonstrated that motivation is a complex issue to evaluate and
determine the extent of what it is and what spurs it in an individual; that psychology has
developed over time through the increased knowledge in the subject matter and advancements in
technology; and that modern psychology continues to look into the question of, motivation
through a clinical approach. Psychology has also demonstrated the value in developing theories
as a framework to determine motivation. Without the established frameworks that psychologists
developed and utilized, there would have been no cohesive understanding of the parameters of
the drivers of motivation and thus, no advancement of knowledge.61
Sociology
According to the American Sociological Association (ASA), sociology is “the study of
our behavior as social beings, covering everything from the analysis of short contacts between
anonymous individuals on the street to the study of global social processes.”62 This definition of
leads to an evaluation of the field to expand beyond what many define as academic sociologists.
In looking at limiting the scope of research, the following section focuses on the development of
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sociological motivation theory stemming from Emile Durkheim’s work by discussing the
foundation of norms and values, the explanations for why individuals abide by norms and values,
and the reasons why individuals would break from these norms (deviation).
Spurring from an interest in the shifting social atmosphere brought about by the Industrial
Revolution and “crises engendered by war,”63 Emile Durkheim sought to answer the question of,
“What keeps society functioning?” In summation, Durkheim concluded that social cohesion,
defined as individuals working together for a common cause, is fundamental to the preservation
of society and that social cohesion is derived from a common sense of cultural norms, beliefs,
and values, helping guide the actions of individuals (and communities).64 In developing this idea,
Durkheim assessed that norms are the values, decisions, and courses of action that a given
culture, community, or group finds desirable or appropriate.65 This characterization of norms and
social cohesion has led sociologists to continually theorize why individuals follow (or not
follow) these agreed upon norms.
In an attempt to better understand this essential question of “why people abide by
norms?” Talcott Parsons and Edwards Shill developed the theory of internalization of social
norms, which postulates that individuals act in accordance with established norms because they
have identified with the norms presented by a community and accepted them as their personal

63

Dennis Peck and Clifton Bryant, 21st Century Sociology (SAGE Publications, Inc., 2007), 119.
64
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.
65
Ladislau Bölön, Taranjeet Singh Bhatia, Saad Ahmad Khan, Jonathan Streater, and Stephen
Fiore, “Toward a computational model of social norms,” PLos ONE 13, no. 4 (April 2018): 1-26;
and Gerry McKenzie, Francesca Moneti, Holly Shokya, and Elaine Denny, What are social
norms? How are they measured? (University of California, San Diego: Center on Global Justice,
July 2015),
https://www.unicef.org/protection/files/4_09_30_Whole_What_are_Social_Norms.pdf.

28
values.66 Joanne Smith and Deborah Terry pose a second explanation with social identity theory,
determining that individual identifies with the community; that an individual acts according to
the group’s norms; and that they see themselves as an extension of that community, not a
separate entity.67 This evaluation is supported by the work of Roderick Kramer and Marilynn
Brewer, which concluded that when individuals are presented with a situation in which they
share in the repercussions of their decisions as a group, they are more inclined to align their
decision making with those in the group.68 David Lewis uses a third perspective in explaining the
reason for individuals to follow a set of given norms. In his book, Lewis focuses on the idea of
rational choice in explaining that individuals choose to follow the given norms because the
benefits to following the norms are greater than if the individual was to deviate from the norm;69
the idea that a choice is merely a logical cost-benefit assessment.
The theories presented above provided valuable insight into why an individual would
abide by norms, however, fails to provide a framework to understand why an individual wouldn’t
abide by proscribed norms. This leads to the concept of deviance, or deviant behavior, defined as
actions that diverge from the normative behaviors of a given group or community.70 The fluidity
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of deviance, like social norms, 71 has led to the proposition of three main theories: social strain
theory, control theory, and labeling theory.72 The first of these, social strain theory is one facet of
Albert Cohen’s work. Cohen theorizes that if an individual is unable to reach their goals
(whether norm-abiding or not) through “norms”, due to factors such as social status or available
resources, it will result in “strain”, results in them turning to deviant behavior to achieve their
goals. 73 Yet, the likelihood that an individual will resort to deviant behavior is exacerbated by a
disassociation with conventional institutions or active association with groups or individuals who
reinforce their deviant behavior.74
A second theory posed is social control theory, which assess that the social bonds an
individual develops with institutions and groups that support societal norms, lead to the reining
in of individual’s deviant behaviors.75 The four bonds posed by this theory are: 1) Attachment,
how loyal an individual is to the institutions; 2) Commitment, the amount that an individual
values their participation in the institutions; 3) Involvement, the amount of time spent engaging
in “conventional activities”; and 4) Belief, the degree to which one accepts the community’s
norms.76 An absence of these social bonds leads an individual to engage in deviant behavior
because people are amoral and would engage in deviant behavior, to achieve one’s goal, if not
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for the reining in of their behavior via these institutions and groups.77 A final sociological theory
is labeling theory. In this theory, when an individual acts in a deviant, or evil, manner, the label
ascribed to their behavior is also ascribed to the individual by society. 78 The individual in turn to
being labeled deviant by the community is treated as less than others, leading to the
internalization of the labeling, and in turn perpetuating the deviant characteristics.79 Labeling
theory can be seen as a type of internalization theory that was expanded beyond the reason that
an individual would abide by social norms. The individuals, labeled as deviant, internalize the
values that the community has told them they have, instead of the values that the community
itself holds.
The sociological theories of motivation discussed in this section proposed reason an
individual would abide by proscribed norms and why an individual would deviate from these
norms. The understanding of the vitality that social norms play in motivating an individual to act
in a given pattern led theorists to determine that these societal pressures must be evaluated in
conjunction with an individual’s internal processes. This realization mirrors psychologists’
understanding that societal factors contribute to motivation, both of which, ultimately led to the
creation of the social psychological approach.
Social Psychology
The previous discussions on psychological and sociological theories of motivation,
revealed dynamic scientific fields of study with unique contributions to literature on motivation
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studies. The emphasis of psychology is the study of the brain, its functions, and the interaction
between the brain and an individual’s behavior. Motivational theory in sociology, stemming
from Emile Durkheim’s work on social norms, postulated numerous reasons as to why an
individual would act according to social norms or in a deviant manner. Yet, while both fields
have unique contribution to the understanding of motivation, current motivational theory
practitioners accept that one’s internal processes and environment are critical in motivating an
individual, leading to the emergence of social psychology. Social psychologists evaluate
individuals’ experience as a whole, including their cognitive functions, emotions, and
perceptions alongside the study of group phenomena and social trends, to provide a deeper
understanding of motivation and decision-making.80 This field has thus produced theories that
provide the most comprehensive understanding of motivation discussed and lays the foundation
for much of those directing their research toward motivation for defection within the intelligence
community, discussed in depth later.
Some of the most important contributions towards the understanding of motivation aided
in the establishment of the field of social psychology; one such theorist was Kurt Lewis. In his
proposition of Lewinian Field Theory,81 he countered the idea of rational choice theory, by
incorporating the variables which would lead an individual to act, evaluating the course of action
that an individual could take, and in a perfect situation, be able to accurately predict the future
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courses of action that an individual would take based on the variables present.82 This theorization
is simplified in the “Lewinian Equation” of B= f(P,E), where behavior (B) is the result of both
the person (P), including their neurological makeup, and their environment (E), to include the
social institutions and their “life-space”.83 However, this theory was rebuffed by
Abraham Maslow, proposing motivation was driven by a hierarchy of needs. In his theory,
Maslow proposes that an individual’s needs are established in a hierarchy format with five levels
ranging from physiological needs, such as food and water, to psychological needs, such as selfactualization.84 Both theories, while differing in structure, define the importance that an
individual’s internal processes and environment have in dictating one’s actions.
The field of social psychology began to shift to a focus on the internalization of a given
situation and the effects on one’s actions, demonstrated in the work of Stanley Milgram and
Philip Zimbardo. Milgram’s experiment saw a scientist (an authority figure) require his
participants to administer increasing levels of “shock” to an unseen participant.85 At the
conclusions of his observations, Milgram theorized that the majority of participants were willing
to administer a lethal shock because: 1) The subject had internalized the sense of fulfilling one’s
duty to carrying out the task at hand to overcome the moral conflict, and/or 2) Their perception
of a given stimuli (the authority figure’s commands) dictated them to obey, allowing them to
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circumvent their own moral apprehension.86 A second theorist that focused on authority and
internalization is Philip Zimbardo. Zimbardo’s most known Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE),
led him to conclude that different situations apply different levels of pressure on an individual;
that from these situational pressures, situational power is ascribed to particular groups, leading to
the ambiguity of how they should act, what their roles are, and how the roles should be carried
out; and individuals in a given role internalized that role, leading to them acting out their
ascribed role, as they have conceived their respective role, regardless of who they were
interacting with.87 The work of both practitioners demonstrates the effect that a given
environment or situation can have on an individual’s perception and ultimately their actions.
Taking into account the various theories and observations of previous practitioners,
Richard Ryan and Edward Deci established Self-Determination Theory (SDT). SDT
characterized by focusing not just on how one pursues a goal, but ultimately on what goals one
chooses to pursue.88 This focus allowed Ryan and Deci identify two types of motivation, intrinsic
and extrinsic. The first type, intrinsically motivated behavior, is an action that one engages in
because of the inherent joy or interest they have in that behavior.89 These types of motivated
actions are seen as innate in humans, yet are either “facilitated” or “undermined” by external
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influences.90 The facilitation of intrinsically motivated actions occurs when an individual
internalizes competence towards a given action, through “interpersonal events and structures”
such as rewards and positive feedback, and that the action is of their own accord.91 The
undermining of these intrinsically motivated actions arise from checks imposed by social
institutions including negative reinforcement, punishment, and mandated to engage in the
behavior, leading to a decrease in the intrinsically motivated actions.92
The second type of motivation noted is external motivation. Externally motivated
behavior or outcome-based behaviors are behaviors that are engaged in for the sole purpose of
achieving a given result.93 Extrinsic motivators are further broken down into three types: external
regulation, introjected regulation, and integrated regulation. External regulation behaviors are
engaged in solely to elicit an external reward, as demonstrated in operant conditioning
experiments.94 The second type, introjected regulation, encourages an individual to engage in
behaviors that are the result of the desire to avoid guilt, induce pride, or raise self-esteem.95
Finally, integrated regulation is an external motivation where an individual has internalized the
regulatory behavior and aligned the new behavior with their norms.96 This assessment of
external motivators includes “traditional motivators”, such as money and praise; it includes

90

Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and
New Directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology 25, no. 1 (2000): 54-67.
91
David Markland, “Self-determination moderates the effects of perceived
competence on intrinsic motivation,” Journal of Sports & Exercise Psychology 21, no. 4 (Dec.
1999): 351-362; and Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations,” 58.
92
Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations,”59.
93
Touré-Tilley and Fishbach, “How to Measure Motivation: A Guide for the Experimental
Social Psychologist,” 329; and Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations,” 60.
94
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan, Handbook of Self-Determination Research (University of
Rochester Press, 2004), 17.
95
Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations,” 62.
96
Ibid.

35
“internal” rewards, such as self-esteem and pride; and it also demonstrates that an external
motivator is able to “shift” to an intrinsic motivator if the actor begins to achieve satisfaction
from the behavior in itself.
Throughout their work, social psychologists have: 1) Concluded that social pressures and
influences can have a significant impact on the internal processes of an individual; 2) One’s
environment poses a variety of constraints and regulations on their motivations; and 3) The line
between an internal and external motivator is fluid, influencing not just how an individual acts,
but also what they act upon. However, the work of social psychologists was not developed in a
vacuum, but was the result of the diligent work of psychologists and sociologists. The work of
these three fields all provide a unique understanding of an individual’s motivation through their
implementation of theories either focusing on an individual’s internal processes, social
institutions, or a combination of both. This deeper understanding of motivation, through the
analysis of these theories, provides various frameworks from which to understand the following
discussion of research that focuses on the motivation for defection within the intelligence
community.

Defection of Individuals Within the Intelligence Community
The work discussed in the previous section was the result of numerous years of scientific
evolution and dedication to the theoretical development of motivation. The predominant field of
study that emerged, social psychology, dictates that one must take into account both
psychological and sociological factors when evaluating motivation. Taking into account this
conclusion, those studying motivation for defection in the intelligence community have
attempted to utilize these frameworks to support their research. The following discussion
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presents the work of practitioners, that are applying motivational studies, to develop an
understanding of the current research that informs U.S. government policy aimed at preventing
and detecting defection within the intelligence community.
Since the development of HUMINT, enticing a potential agent to defect (recruitment) has
been an undeniable goal of intelligence officers. This process is known as the Agent Recruitment
Cycle (ARC) and is summed up in seven steps: 1) spotting, the involvement in groups or places
that would expose the officer to potential agents; 2) assessing, identifying a potential target; 3)
development, actual contact with the assessed target including levels of contact from infrequent
to frequent; 4) pitching, or the actual proposal for the agent to work with the intelligence officer;
5) formalization, when given a “yes” the officer and agent outline the specifics of their
relationship including expectations, compensations, and timeline; 6) producing, the actual
collection of intelligence by the officer via the agent; and 7) termination, the conclusion of the
relationship.97
To better assist intelligence officers in the assessing, development, and pitching of an
agent, the intelligence community developed the acronym “MICE”. This acronym, which stands
for money, ideology, coercion (or compromise), and ego,98 is designed to help intelligence
officer’s understand what part of an individual’s motivation is leverageable to entice the agent to
defect. In response to MICE, Randy Burkett sought to provide a more expansive tool that focuses
on manipulating the perception of the asset. He proposes the use of RASCLS, which stands for
reciprocation, authority, scarcity, commitment and consistency, liking, and social proof.99 This
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tool outlines behaviors and an “atmosphere” that officers should promote to entice an individual
to defect, as opposed to attempting to understand the motivation of the asset. These tools,
presented as attempts to understand motivation and perception, are intended to help an
intelligence officer move an asset through the ARC.
As opposed to the development of MICE and RASCLS, the work of Lydia Wilson
attempts to understand the underlying causes of defection through the application of reversal
theory. She seeks to explain why an individual would shift from “a normal conforming life to
rebelliousness through risk taking and espionage”.100 Reversal theory claims there are four pairs
of “domains” supporting eight “motivational states”, that individuals are continually fluctuating
between these states, and that changes in these motivational state illicit different responses due to
variation in given situations or state of mind.101 Wilson concludes that, in the face of a
“triggering event”, an individual’s inability to freely shift between motivational states and a lack
of protective frames, or coping mechanisms, leads to defection.102
A second attempt to identifying the underlying causes of defection is posed by Dr. Ursula
Wilder, a CIA psychologist. In taking a clinical psychological approach, she established a threepronged approach to developing an understanding of motivation for defection, which include
personality pathology; an “acute personal crisis resulting in intense duress” or a triggering event;
and an ease of opportunity to conduct espionage.103 Identified personality defects include a lack
of understanding of the implications for an individual’s actions, a sense that one is “above the

100

Lydia Wilson, “Reversal Theory: Understanding the Motivation Styles or Espionage,”
International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 3, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2012): 76-100.
101
Michael, Apter, Motivational styles in everyday life: A guide to reversal theory, (Washington,
DC, US: American Psychological Association, 2001).
102
Wilson, “Reversal Theory.”
103
Ursula Wilder, “The Psychology of Espionage,” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 (June 2017):
19-36.

38
rules”, and impulsivity for risky behaviors. 104 Wilder discusses that these characteristics,
exacerbated by an intense personal crisis leads to distress, which results in impulsive
decisions.105 The final aspect of Wilder’s three-pronged approach is the ease of opportunity to
conduct the espionage. Without going into depth on this aspect, Wilder’s work illustrates the
necessity for the defector to have frequent access to classified information and a “customer” to
deliver the information to.106 Supplementing her three-prong approach to what leads to defection,
Wilder identifies that individuals with “healthy personalities” are able to operate within stressful
conditions because of sufficient coping mechanisms; have relatively stable moods; exemplify
moral behavior across a variety of situations; and have/experience a spectrum of emotions.107
Both Wilson and Wilder advanced the field of defection studies beyond the realm of
“tools for intelligence officers” by seeking to understand the underlying causes of what leads to
defection. Their conclusions identify that an individual’s personality predisposition, coupled with
a “triggering event”, ultimately leads an individual to defect. Wilder took her proposition
forward by proposing that people with healthy personalities don’t defect, noting that they have
an ability to experience an emotional range, yet, have the ability to emotionally navigate stressful
situations.
A final approach, that attempts to incorporate an understanding of the motivator for
defection and the underlying factors that led an individual to defect, is Katherine Herbig’s bigdata analytic approach. Using data from the Defense Personnel Security Research Center’s
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(PERSEC) Espionage Database, an aggregation of unclassified information on defection cases,
108

Herbig evaluated variables ranging from motivation for defection to the organization and

clearance level of the individual that defected.109 In her analysis, she identified five primary
trends. First, that the majority of defectors had foreign influences, such as foreign citizenship,
family ties, or connections.110 Second, only a limited number of defectors had drug, financial, or
gambling problems.111 Third, the most common motivators were: first, financial compensation;
second, divided loyalties; and third, disgruntlement. Additionally, ingratiation, coercion, thrills,
and recognition are strong motivators. 112 A final observation was that a triggering event, in
conjunction with other motivators, was a primary factor leading to defection.113 Herbig’s
approach took a macro-level approach to understanding motivator for defection, providing
researchers vital trend analysis to be used in the future.
This section demonstrated that those studying motivation for defection within the
intelligence community: cultivated an understanding of motivation by developing tools to aid
intelligence officers in enticing defection; that an individual’s environment, in conjunction with
their internal processes, motivate an individual; and that there are a myriad of factors when
identifying what motivates an individual to defect. While presenting numerous trends and
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observations, those looking at defection within the intelligence community failed to operate
within a theoretical framework, which led to the observation that money, divergent loyalties,
disgruntlement, psychological components, and triggering events all play a critical role in an
individual’s defection.

Current Methods in Preventing Defection
The U.S. government has identified a need to prevent and detect defection within the
intelligence community in support of the advancement of national and international security.
Taking their lead from those directing their research at motivation for defection, they have
sought to prevent defection by countering five factors that have been assessed to lead an
individual to defect: money, divergent loyalties, disgruntlement, psychological components, and
triggering events. In its efforts to prevent and detect defection, the U.S. government utilizes a
combination of pre-employment screenings; opportunities, preventative action, and services
during employment; and post-employment services and measures.
Pre-Employment Screening
Unlike many other companies and organizations, accepting an offer to a position within
the intelligence community is a substantial process, beginning with an individual passing a
polygraph examination and obtaining a top-secret security clearance with access to sensitive
compartmental information (TS/SCI with Poly).114 The adjudication process (obtaining the
aforementioned clearances) is overseen by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Using
the following 13 categories as a framework, the OPM, evaluates the suitability of a candidate
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through a variety of investigative techniques: allegiance to the U.S., foreign influence, foreign
preference, sexual behavior, personal conduct, financial considerations, alcohol consumption,
drug involvement, psychological conditions, criminal conduct, handling protected information,
outside activities, and use of information systems.115
The first step for an applicant begins prior to an individual’s application for employment
by limiting clearances to U.S. citizens only.116 Once confirmed as a U.S. citizen, an applicant
then submits an SF-86, an extensive questionnaire that covers various aspects of an individual’s
life and focuses on the 13 OPM categories.117 The applicant’s public records, such as taxes and
credit record, are pulled and compared with the answers presented in the SF-86. If the
information is corroborated, the individual is then brought in for an in-person interview with an
investigator to reaffirm the information within the submitted form. The applicant then sits for a
polygraph examination to further verify the information within the SF-86 and any other
“questionable” activity that arose during the in-person investigation. The examination focuses on
the accuracy of the individual’s SF-86, the level of candor that the applicant has exhibited in
regards to their application, foreign interests and loyalties, and personal choices, such as drug
usage, ultimately determining if the individual has integrity or if there are existing vulnerabilities
that could lead to defection.118 Once concluded, these initial steps are followed by a series of
additional investigative steps.
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The first is a psychological examination that evaluates an individual’s past, present,
and/or future drug usage, personality traits, or other aspects of their psychological profile that
could lend to a predisposition to defection.119 This is followed with a series of in-person
interviews with the applicant’s family, friends, and neighbors along with personal and
professional references provided on the SF-86, in an attempt to ascertain any additional
information that was not disclosed or contradicts previous findings in the process.120 In
concluding the investigative process, the application then moves to the OPM to evaluate the
individual, taking a case-by-case approach to their decision. Lin their process, the OPM looks at
the whole person and evaluates potential situations of “concern” by taking into account the
severity of a situation, the duration of it, how long ago it was, the impact it had on the applicant,
and the propensity for it to happen again.121 If found favorable, the applicant is “successfully
adjudicated” and granted their TS/SCI with Poly, thus able to access classification when they
have a “need to know”.
On average, the clearance process can take between 9-12 months, 122 however, can take as
long as 24 months, depending on the extent of international contacts. The timeline and
redundancies within this process demonstrate the lengths that the U.S. government goes through
to prevent people with a predisposition for defection from accessing classified information.
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Opportunities, Preventative Action, and Services During Employment
In denying individuals with a predisposition for defection from accessing classified
information, the government is also denying them the ability to defect. However, the clearance
process is the way to begin to do one’s job within the intelligence community. Work within the
intelligence community is characterized as secretive, fast-paced, and stressful, 123 all of which
could lead to adverse responses, such as defection. Identifying that an individual could revert to
maladaptive behavior within this novel atmosphere, 124 agencies within the intelligence
community have developed a number of opportunities and support services, coupled with
proactive preventative measures, aimed at mitigating potentially triggering events.
Some of the noteworthy programs and services provided through the various intelligence
agencies include fiscal support through the paying off of student loans or tuition
reimbursement;125 family support services that provide family members a more in-depth
understanding of the intelligence organization that the intelligence officer works for;
opportunities to develop relationships within the intelligence organization through resource
groups;126 and opportunities for a flexible schedule and hours.127 These programs are intended to
lighten financial burdens, develop a sense of “alignment” with the agency their working with,
and demonstrate that the U.S. government cares about the wellbeing of them and their families.
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While providing the above services, the government also takes a proactive approach to
defection prevention and detection through the periodic reinvestigation of employees. Every five
years, an individual with access to classified information must undergo a similar adjudication
process as outlined above to reassert their suitability.128 The nature of the intelligence
community, working with classified information and foreign nationals, lends an individual to
become increasingly more exposed to opportunities to “breach” any of the OPM’s 13 categories.
Reinvestigations allows the government to find and revoke access for those that are predisposed
to defection or, in more a more dire situation, identify those who have already defected and have
yet to be discovered.
Post-Employment Services and Actions
In the wake of a separation of employee from the intelligence community, the
government must take steps to prevent the defection of an individual because while they may not
currently have tangible access to classified information, they don’t “forget” all the intelligence,
sources, and methods that they worked with throughout their career. To address this constant
threat posed by former employees, the government takes steps to assist in their reintegration,
takes proactive measures to prevent defection, or takes retroactive measures to mitigate further
damage. The services and courses of action are determined by the way or reason for separation.
Under amicable conditions, such as career change or retirement, services are aimed at
providing the individual a way to make a living and social reintegration. For many working in
the intelligence community, one primary difficulty of applying for another job is that much of
their career and experience is classified. To help navigate is situation, the intelligence
community has created the publication review boards (PRB) that audits potential resumes for
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classified material, which provides the intelligence officer an approved description of their
activity, while protecting national secrets that may unintentionally be divulged.129 This same
service is also used to edit books for classified information that former officers intend to publish,
an avenue to garner intelligence community buy-in, while informing the public about
intelligence activities and creating a livelihood for themselves outside of the intelligence
community. Ultimately, the services by the PRB are designed to prevent disgruntlement of
former employees and elicit intelligence community buy-in in the future protection of classified
information.
A second opportunity that has been further established to help intelligence officers
reintegrate into society are membership organizations. Two primary examples are the Central
Intelligence Retirees Association (CIRA) and SIGNA society. These organizations provide
scholarships to the families of previous employees of the CIA, implement community building
events such as luncheons, and the publication of newsletters and directories to help keep
members informed and connected.130 These organizations, while shrouded in secrecy, are
designed to establish reintegration into society, outside of the intelligence community, while
maintaining intimate connections with those that have lived similar lifestyles as themselves.
These services demonstrate the government’s efforts at helping former intelligence employees
reintegrate into a life outside of the intelligence community, reestablish social bonds, and
maintain already established bonds (with those of similar experiences).
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As demonstrated above, the government has sought to protect its classified information,
from those that left amicably, through services and cooperation. However, when an employee
leaves under less favorable conditions, such as firing or losing one’s clearance, the government
enacts measures to prevent the disclosure of state secrets. One initiative is that that U.S.
government will pay for the former employee’s psychological and therapeutic services for a
determined period.131 They are intended to help an individual cope with the separation, deal with
any substance abuse issues, and with social reintegration. However, other times individuals are
separated for more sever reasons and face criminal charges.132 Many instances of the lessamicable separation of an intelligence employee is due to a serious breach of one (or multiple) of
the OPM’s 13 categories, and many times is also a legal violation and will be treated as such.
The intelligence community’s first priority is to safeguard state secrets and will go to
extraordinary lengths, such as firing and bringing criminal charges against former employees, to
protect them. However, while fulfilling it’ obligation to protect state secrets, the intelligence
community concurrently seeks to help former employees reintegrate into civilian life and fosters
social connections between former employees and the various communities they are a part of. In
effect, the intelligence community is preventing defection through advancing the lives of their
employees’ post-employment, a win/win situation.133
The previous chapter evaluated how the fields of psychology and sociology developed
theories to explain motivation. These theories were developed and refined through paradigm
shifts and technological improvements, ultimately converging and leading to the field of social
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psychology. Social psychologists established theoretical frameworks that postulate that
motivation is determined by the interaction of environmental influences (external motivations)
on an individual’s psychological processes (internal motivations). In seeking to apply an
understanding of external and internal motivators, practitioners turned to directing their research
at motivation for defection within the intelligence community. Their work, focusing on
defection, developed tools to aid intelligence officers in enticing defection; assessed that
personality predispositions, in conjunction with a triggering event, lead to an individual’s
motivation to defect; and iterated that money, divergent loyalties, disgruntlement, psychological
components, and triggering events play a critical role in determining motivation for defection.
Taking their understanding of defection from this body of literature, the U.S. government
developed three main phases where they seek to prevent and detect defection: pre-employment
screenings; opportunities, preventative action, and services during employment; and postemployment services and retroactive measures. The first phase seeks to prevent a predisposed
individual from accessing classified information. The second, established programs to decrease
stressors that could lead to defection while continuing to ensure that individuals are suitable to
access classified information. Finally, the third phase is intended to assist in the reintegration of
individuals that have left the intelligence community under amicable terms and suppress the
ability to compromise national security of those that have left under less amicable conditions. In
all, the government, in their effort to prevent and detect defection use carrot and stick measures
that were developed in light of the information provided by those studying motivation for
defection within the intelligence community.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION THROUGH CASE STUDIES
The following five cases of defection within the intelligence community demonstrate that
those studying motivation for defection have failed to develop an extensive understanding of
what truly motivates an individual to defect. This failure is evidenced by a reliance on the
theoretical frameworks posed by psychologists, sociologists, and social psychologists to
understand the motivation of a defector. The government’s ability to establish effective policies
to prevent and detect defection is also impaired by the failures of those conducting direct
research on defection, is within the intelligence community. To present an effective analysis, I
use the defector’s past to identify any social or developmental factors; any diagnosed or subthreshold psychological conditions or pathologies; available testimonies from the defectors
themselves, their families, or past coworkers on declared motivation; and the variables
surrounding the actual act of defection to include the kinds of information compromised or
frequency of the behavior. Taking this approach will allow me to effectively present the
successes and failures of previous attempts in explaining the defection; the successes and failures
of current governmental efforts in combating defection within the intelligence community; and to
discuss whether alternatives to the chosen approaches posed any more viable in being able to
determine or prevent the defection of a given case.
While having various positives, this approach does have an apparent deficiency. When
presenting the cases, I will not be applied a standardized methodology of theoretical analysis.
Instead, I will be utilizing various theoretical and applied perspectives in attempts to best
understand what motivates an individual. This technique stems, first, from the privilege of
hindsight, allowing me to highlight specific points of an individual, recognized by previous
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research, to determine motivation. This approach, however, more importantly, is systemic due to
the lack of theoretical foundation posed by those studying motivation for defection within the
intelligence community. Therefore, through an evaluation of five case studies, this section
presents an understanding of the factors, as assessed by the previously presented research, that
lead to defection. While creating an intimate understanding of the motivation for defection, my
analysis demonstrates that the study of motivation for defection within the intelligence has failed
to develop a theoretical, and thus an incomplete, understanding of what motivates an individual
to defect, resulting in failures by the government to prevent and detect defection.

Case Selection
In evaluating the cases of John Walker, Robert Hanssen, Edward Howard, Ana Montes,
and Aldrich Ames, I recognize my inability to evaluate all cases of defection within the
intelligence community, and, in turn, have selected cases that provide an array of genders,
intelligence agencies, motivating factors, and governmental actions/inactions. I also recognize
that the presentation of only cases where an individual defected limits the understanding of
factors that could have contributed to defection, however, my analysis is not focusing on what
motivates an individual to defect within the intelligence community, but seeks to evaluate
whether those that study motivation for defection within the intelligence community adequately
inform government procedures to prevent and detect defection. Also absent from my analysis are
those cases of defection that have not yet been discovered, or will not be discovered. Attending
to these cases will not only be impossible by virtue of their continued undiscovered nature,
however, as with the cases of those that work within the intelligence community, not the focus of
my research.
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The following defectors being investigated, presented in chronological order, all began
their activities against the U.S. during the Cold War, a period characterized by a bipolar
structure,134 which limited the number of predominant international actors at the time to the U.S.
and USSR, highlighting the ideological differences as a root of tensions between the two super
powers.135 The tensions and superpower competition between the U.S. and USSR produced 142
of 209 cases of espionage against the U.S. (available to the public) between 1949-1989.136
Looking back to the most prolific time period of defection within the U.S. allows for a greater
accumulation of information on the subjects being discussed as more information is declassified
and made public. Another benefit is the vast number of intelligence agencies involved in the
handling of classified information on a variety of topics to include South America, Russia, and
China, providing diversity within the analysis via the agency that the individual worked for and
the information they were privy to. In all, limiting the timeline provides the opportunity to
analyze cases of defectors across a vast number of agencies and intelligence material; allows for
accessed to increasingly more comprehensive information on the cases being discussed (because
of declassification, etc.); and includes the development and evolution of the U.S. government’s
response and measures focusing on defection prevention.

John A. Walker Jr.
John Walker Jr. was a Naval communications officer who had access to secure SIGINT
and cyphers and, post-retirement from the Navy, intelligence material his remaining “network”
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was able to acquire and deliver, selling much of this information to the USSR from 1968 until his
arrest in 1985.137 Walker’s past and the way in which he carried out his defection activities
support the previous conclusions that an individual’s personality influences an individual’s
propensity to defect and that an individual’s motivation can change over time. However,
Walker’s case also presents a critique to the previous research in that the factors leading to his
defection blur the lines between internal and external motivators, all of which must be
considered when evaluating his motivation for defection.
John Walker’s childhood is best described as troubling, which consisted of being raised
by an abusive alcoholic father; attending a Catholic school where he rebelled against the
perceived harshness of the nuns, garnering poor grades; and engaging in criminal behavior such
as burglary.138 Walker also saw himself continually competing with his older brother, who
achieved good grades, better social standing, and an overall social “success”.139 However, this
brother would prove to be Walker’s lifeline, where after one of Walker’s arrests and convictions,
his brother sought leniency from the judge, providing Walker the opportunity to join the Navy in
October of 1955. Once in the Navy, Walker’s deviant behavior seemed to stop, being recognized
as “highly competent,” quickly rising to the rank of warrant officer, and serving on a variety of
vessels, establishing a successful career in communications working with classified
cryptographic equipment.140 Walker’s life post-1955 would suggest that he left his life of crime
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and delinquency by establishing a reputation as a hard-working naval officer and relatively stable
and happy personal life,141 until October of 1967, when John Walker’s successes would unravel
when he walked into the USSR embassy and sold a piece of the classified cryptographic
information he worked with, solidifying his defection from the U.S. to the USSR.142
Walker’s later defection activities included more than delivering classified information he
had direct access to by recruiting his brother Author Walker; son, Michael Walker; and friend
Jerry Whitworth, along with numerous failed attempts to recruit his daughter, Laura Snyder.143
This group of defectors became an established spy ring that fed classified information to Walker,
who in turn sold it to the USSR. In 1985, after establishing a spy ring within the U.S. military;
compromising secure naval communication channels that revealed critical information on missile
defense systems, capabilities, and technology; and the compromising of U.S. sea defenses,
operations, and capabilities, Walker was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison,
where he died in 2014.144
John Walker’s life, prior to his defection, was characterized by crime and delinquency
until his employment with the Navy, where he excelled in his work; a lifestyle shift explained by
sociologists. The primary proposition by sociologists, to support Walker’s shift in his choices, is
the impact of increased establishment of social ties. Within the literature on Walker’s life, he is
seen to have enjoyed his work within the smaller divisions, developing close ties with his
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coworkers and an appreciation for the work that he was doing,145 leading Walker to either
internalize the new group norms or to meet their norms to achieve a desired outcome. Walker’s
eventual defection calls into question the underlying nature in the shift of his actions, where Dr.
Ursula Wilder’s work presents another view of what led to Walker’s behavioral shift.
Ursula Wilder’s work focuses on personality and psychological disorders that influence
an individual’s actions, discussing various traits that impact an individual’s defection, such as
psychopathy. Wilder’s identification of Walker’s psychopathic tendencies provides insight into
this pivotal shift in Walker’s life. His psychopathic tendencies lend to the belief that the shift
arose from the ability to leave a good first impression on his new group; the manipulation of the
perspective of past acquaintances that he was now a “success” (specifically his older brother
Author who was also in the Navy); and the development of personal relationships for
exploitation later.146 This shift from deviance to the “model sailor” is one glimpse into the early
emergence of the effect that Walker’s personality had on his motivation. Wilder’s postulation
that Walker has psychopathic personality traits draws upon his defection and his desire and
ability to recruit additional agents to defect.147
One key component of Walker’s defection was that he was a walk-in, meaning that he
approached the USSR, as opposed to them coming to him. At the time of Walker’s defection, he
engaged in various behaviors, a time of perceived decline in importance to others, demonstrating
a desire to elevate his status and image, an additional psychopathic characteristic. The first aspect
of his life endorsing this claim is his declining role within the Navy. Walker was past the
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highlight of his early career, characterized by plank-ownership (being a founding member of a
crew) and rapid advancements, which was quickly followed by an integration into larger crews,
where his impact was less significant that before.148 Another aspect of this time in Walker’s life
was his increasing infidelity to his wife. During the time leading to his defection, Walker had
multiple affairs with other women; showing little remorse for the pain he caused his wife and
their family,149 further validating Wilder’s claims that Walker exemplified psychopathic
tendencies. In all, John Walker’s personality led him to lead a life of change, from deviance to
excellence (within the Navy), however, during his fall from prominence, sought out ways in his
personal and professional life to again be seen as an important individual.
After Walker’s initial defection in 1967, he continued to provide the USSR with
classified material until his arrest in 1985. As noted above, his personality and desire for
prominence led him to defect and his continued acts of espionage can be seen as a persistence of
this motivation until 1974. Walker, still in the Navy, befriended a naval enlisted member named
Jerry Whitworth, his first recruit for the USSR. With the recruit of another service member,
Walker was now able to continue his production of secure information after his retirement from
the navy in 1976.150 However, this advancement in his defection activity, the persuasion and
recruitment of other potential assets, demonstrates an evolution in his motivation. Walker’s
recruitment didn’t stop at his friend, but went on to include his son, Michael, and older brother,
Author. This evolution, while a continuation of various aspects of his personality to include an
ability to manipulate other individuals and engaging in risky behavior, also encompasses the
motivation to engage in the “game of espionage”, for the game’s sake. Walker’s motivational
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transformation from a push, due to his personality, to a pull, of the “game of espionage”, is
evidenced by his claims of engaging in his defection out of excitement and his claims that the
behavior that he engaged in changed the world for the better, offering the USSR an advantage
from which to negotiate arms treaties with the U.S.151 Walker’s motivation for defection,
stemming from his psychopathic personality tendencies, excitement for the game of espionage,
in conjunction with his desire and ability to recruit other assets to aid him in his defection, led
him to be one of the most successful defectors in U.S. history.
Much of the previous literature has helped inform John Walker’s motivation for
defection. One prominent viewpoint came from Ursula Wilder, who concluded that Walker’s
psychopathic personality’s contribution to his defection. However, one aspect that is
unexplainable by previous research on defection is the prevalent role that money continued to
play in the defection. Katherine Herbig’s research, supports this observation by concluding that
money is the greatest motivating factor in leading to an individual’s defection,152 however,
provides limited help beyond this observation. In supplanting the observations of Herbig, with
the work of social psychologists, I have demonstrated that, for Walker, money plays a role
beyond its physical purchasing ability.
Money for Walker, while an external motivator, was interpreted as a status symbol; the
more the USSR paid him, the more valuable he was to them. A second role that money played
was the role that money played in allowing him to manipulate others into helping him in his
defection. Money became a facilitator for him to engage in the game of espionage. Therefore,
while money played a role in his defection, theoretical interpretation demonstrates what kind of
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role it played. Therefore, while Walker’s primary motivation for defection was his disordered
personality, pushing him to seek out the game of espionage, exacerbated by his interpretation of
money and its facilitating role.

Robert Hanssen
Over the course of his 35-year career at the FBI, Robert Hanssen served as a field agent,
as a counter-intelligence agent, and an employee within the budget department. All of these
positions gave him unfettered access to vital information about numerous cases, operatives
working against the USSR (and after its collapse, Russia) and classified computer systems and
encryption technology, all of which he sold to the USSR beginning in 1979 until his arrest in
2001.153 Hanssen’s case, like that of John Walker, is supported by the conclusion that an
individual’s personality predisposition plays a role in leading to an individual’s defection and is
mitigated, or exacerbated, by one’s environment. The conclusions of the following case calls into
question previous observations by sociologists that social bonds orients an individual’s actions
along lines of established norms and that the government, while taking many steps in preventing
defection through the separation and compartmentalization of information, in conjunction with
an inherent trust in the selection process to obtain individuals adverse to defection, encumbered
the combatting of Robert Hanssen’s defection.
Robert Hanssen, born in 1944 in Chicago, was raised in an authoritative household was
head by his father, which exposed him to ample levels of physical and emotional abuse directed
at teaching Hanssen how to “be a man”.154 This led Hanssen to socially isolate himself from his
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peers, like many other victims of child abuse.155 His childhood behavior was also characterized
by risky behavior, such as racing his car, yet also isolationist behavior, such as reading in a
secluded environment.156 Academically, Hanssen was an above average student who began
dental school, yet ended dropped out to follow in his father’s footsteps as a police officer. Once
in the Chicago Police Department, Hanssen was assigned to a special division, C-5, that
conducted internal investigations.157 From here, he pursued employment within the intelligence
community, failing to get picked up by the NSA in the early years of his career searching,
eventually getting hired by the FBI in January of 1976.158 Hanssen eventually found himself in
the New York field office in the White-Collar division, quickly being reassigned to the Soviet
intelligence division (Division Three), where he ended up spending a significant amount of time
working with FBI computer systems, granting him significant access to classified information,
all within the first years of his employment.159 In 1979, three years after swearing allegiance to
the FBI, Hanssen walked into an intermediary and delivered a message, under a false identity,
that he had classified information that he wanted to sell to the USSR, the beginning of his
defection.160 His defection activity would continue until his arrest in 2001, after he had
compromised “numerous” human sources, “dozens” of classified government documents and
programs, and “numerous” FBI counterintelligence procedures,161 along with a range other
crimes outlined during his prosecution.
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In the case of Robert Hanssen, it is assessed that the abuse that Hanssen received from his
father played a role in directing him in the future; however, the degree to which it impacted his
decision-making continues to be debated. One critical aspect influenced by an individual’s past is
their personality. Hanssen exhibited numerous aspects of a psychopathic personality beginning at
a young age. As a child, Hanssen isolated himself from his peers, engaged in risky behaviors to
include racing and pursuing a career in law enforcement, and joining the intelligence community
for the “excitement”.162 However, examples of his disordered personality continue to emerge
throughout his life. The first is the constant reference to Hanssen’s inflated sense of self-worth,
by his colleagues and peers,163 where in their critique of Hanssen, they saw him as an intelligent
individual, yet found him difficult to work with because of his arrogance. A second example of
his psychopathic tendencies is his belief that his intellectual prowess was being overlooked by
the higher ups and that he was being underutilized.164 Both of these personality characteristics, in
hindsight, demonstrate a predisposed to defection.
During Hanssen’s defection, his psychopathic personality is more evident than the period
prior to his defection. Throughout the 22 years that he sold information to the USSR, Hanssen
operated under a number of aliases, including Ramon Garcia and Jim Baker.165 Working
undercover provided Hanssen a sense of security allowing him to leverage USSR and impose his
demands because of his position of power within the FBI and the sense of security that he
created for himself by using aliases. A second aspect of his defection that demonstrates his
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psychopathic tendencies is evidenced in his lying to his wife when caught spying on the FBI. In
1980, Hanssen’s wife caught him with classified information, confronted him about it, and upon
finding out the truth was promised that Hanssen would not continue his arrangement with the
USSR. Hanssen would renege on this promise and continue to work for the USSR (and Later
Russia) for another 20 years.166 Hanssen’s pre-defection and post-defection tendencies indicate
strong the role that his personality played in his decision-making. However, Hanssen’s
personality did not exist in a vacuum and was greatly influenced by his environment.
One primary environmental factor identified in the life of Hanssen was his work at the
FBI. Prior to his defection, Hanssen quickly rose within the FBI, yet perceived that he was
continually passed over for more prestigious counterintelligence (CI) operations, increasing both
a sense of of disillusionment with his coworkers and resentment towards his superiors for failing
to recognize his abilities.167 Both of these factors provide an understand ding of the atmosphere
that would lead Hanssen to defect, however, there is a lack of understanding as to what would
lead to a jump from disgruntlement and lack of social bonds (to his workplace), to defecting.
One avenue that would provide insight is in the challenge that Hanssen’s case poses to
sociologists that claim that social bonds, to norm abiding institutions and one’s community, lead
an individual to follow established norms. In Hanssen’s case, his established social bonds were
to the church and Catholicism,168 a religion characterized by strict adherence to a moral code,
which included acts such as his refusal of alcohol.169 Hanssen’s proclaimed religiosity, in light of
his psychopathic tendencies, would suggest that his involvement with the church was merely a
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façade. However, Eric O’ Neil, the FBI agent credited with obtaining Hanssen’s confession after
months of uncover work getting to know Hanssen on an intimate level, along with most of those
who interacted with Hanssen throughout his life, describe his religiosity as genuine.170 Therefore,
in understanding the role that social bonds play, previous work would suggest that Hanssen
would abide by the norms set forth by the church, to include: upholding his oaths that he made to
the FBI to protect the U.S.; the oath he took, upon being granted access to classified information,
that he would not divulge it to unauthorized personnel; and, on a personal level, keep his
promises that he made to his wife, on multiple occasions, that he would stop spying against the
U.S.
In response to this puzzle, I pose that Hanssen was in fact following norm, albeit on a
selective basis, to an all-consuming aspect of his life, his job. As previously iterated, much of the
work of the intelligence community is shrouded in secrecy and, by virtue, lends to a loose
interpretation of the truth. Therefore, I postulate that this dichotomy to two “masters” created an
undeniable struggle within Hanssen, driving him to defect. The morals of the intelligence
community, of lying and sometime more devious behavior, would seem counter to the culture of
Catholicism, which is based in rejection of any and all sin. Therefore, I pose that the
incorporation of Lydia Wilson’s application of reversal theory is appropriate. In this theory, a
given situation determines a motivational state of mind by “switching” between domains,
however, in a crisis, an inability to switch leads to defection.171 Therefore, I pose that Hanssen’s
inability to traverse the motivational states, from the desire of rejection of sin to the desire to
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engage in “intelligence activities”; in the face of the continual internal crisis of serving two
masters; exacerbated by the stressful nature of his relatively new job within the intelligence
community; coupled with his disgruntlement and disillusionment with his coworkers, led to his
defection. This viewpoint, while seated in research, requires an incorporation of both theoretical
research and defection studies to fully understand the implications and impact of Hanssen’s
situation on his decision to defect. Absent either would have left one with the understanding that
the disgruntlement or disillusionment alone would have led to his defection.
Robert Hanssen’s case also presents a strong example of current deficits within the
government’s efforts to prevent and detect defection. Near the end of Hanssen’s career, there
were multiple instances where his behavior raised “red flags”, that his superiors overlooked or
Hanssen was able to explain away without further investigation, allowing him to continue his
activities for the USSR. One “flagrant” security breach was when Hanssen hack into the FBI
system from a colleague’s computer and retrieve “sensitive” information about USSR agents and
operations. He would go on to report what he had done to his superiors, claiming he did so to
demonstrate vulnerabilities in the system.172 The FBI accepted this explanation without further
inquiry. A second failure by the FBI to address security concerns is the failure to investigate
Hanssen’s abnormal financial activity, reported by his brother in-law.173
These examples of the failures of the FBI demonstrate two critical problems inherent in
the government’s prevention and detection of defection. The first is that the process of defection
prevention relies heavily on an individual obtaining a security clearance. While unable to
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determine how many defectors the clearance process has stopped, it has created a sense of
unquestionable trust in employees who have been successfully adjudicated. Trusting an
employee is imperative in letting them fulfill their job, however, in situations, such as a security
breach, that call into question an individual’s trustworthiness need to be investigated as if an
individual, while presumed innocent, has the potential to be guilty of the charges. This leads to
the second problem inherent with the current system, that individuals within the intelligence
community must abide by the rules and procedures set in place to be able to prevent defection.
This second problem will continue to be an inevitable part of combatting defection, regardless of
the procedures put forward, because of the innate ability of humans to choose to engage in a
behavior or not.
Robert Hanssen, raised in a troubling household, sought out a career in the exciting field
of the intelligence community, ultimately joining the FBI in 1976 where, three years later, he
began a 22-year career of feeding classified intelligence to the USSR and Russia (RUS). The
prevalence of his psychopathic tendencies influenced him to compromise national security. His
case supports the previous conclusions by theorists and practitioners that personality plays an
imperative role in an individual’s decision to defect. Hanssen’s case also demonstrated the
paradoxical nature that social bonds create in an individual. On one hand, Hanssen had an
inseparable devotion to the Catholic church, and on the other, an intense devotion to the game of
espionage. I postulate that this internal conflict led to an inability to transition motivational states
and ultimately, in conjunction with a sense of disgruntlement and disillusionment, to his
defection. The study of Hanssen’s case also reveals two problems within current U.S. efforts to
combat defection; an overreliance on the security adjudication process, leading to unquestioned
trust in an individual, and the necessity for employees within the intelligence community to
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abide by security procedures without deviation. In all, Hanssen’s case provides support for
previous claims of the importance of personality in defection motivation and the utility of those
focusing on motivation for defection; yet, reinforces that a theoretical lens was required to truly
understand Hanssen’s motivation to defect. The U.S. government’s ability to prevent and detect
Hanssen’s defection demonstrates that the current process is inherently flawed because of the
innate characteristics of a human to rely on the security clearance process and their ability to
make independent decisions in enforcing security procedures.

Edward Howard
Prior to graduating from the CIA’s training school at Camp Peary, known as The Farm,
Edward Howard had previously been denied employment at the CIA, worked for the Peace
Corps, and completed a degree from American University.174 These experiences eventually led to
his recruitment for the CIA’s Soviet division, a prestigious posting for an intelligence officer.
However, prior to deploying, Howard failed a polygraph examination and in June 1983, after less
than three years of employment, was fired from the CIA.175 While never deploying to a CIA field
office, Howard was being groomed to deploy to the sensitive area and was privy to the classified
information within the division. In late 1983 or fall of 1984 (the date of actual defection is
unknown but speculated upon by Howard’s testimony and analysis of his travel around the times
of alleged defection activity),176 after being fired from the CIA, Howard delivered classified
information to the USSR, beginning his life as a defector. Howard’s delivery compromised
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HUMINT sources the CIA had in place in the USSR and U.S. operating procedures when
handling assets in denied areas of operation (such as the USSR).177 Howard’s defection was
eventually discovered by the CIA, was the subject of an extensive FBI investigation, and fled the
U.S., where he found refuge in the USSR until his death in 2002.
Unlike the previous cases in this paper, Edward Howard did not defect to the USSR until
a year after being fired from the CIA, yet his personality indicated a predisposition to defection
before his employment. The primary aspects of Howard’s personality that were indicators were
his drug usage and generally deviant behavior, including petty theft.178 Both of these deviant
behaviors are examples of risk-seeking behavior, a sub-threshold symptom of personality
disorders. In the case of Howard, these predisposing personality characteristics, evaluated from
the perspective of Lydia Wilson’s reversal theory, provide a more comprehensive understanding
of his defection.
Howard’s failure of his polygraph examination, and subsequent firing from the CIA, is
the second rejection Howard received from the CIA and is the triggering event that set his
defection in motion. Howard was first rejected from the CIA when his application for
employment was turned down, resulting in him employment with the Peace Corp and then
USAID.179 Instead of responding in similar fashion to his second rejection from the CIA,
Howard deviated from conventional norms and defected to the USSR. Reversal theory sheds
light on the divergent results by proposing, first, that Howard’s response was different because
they were different situations. Howard’s first rejection was from seeking employment, while his
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firing was after he was already an employee with an invested interest. The second proposition
postulates that since Howard was actively engaged in disordered behavior, excessive drinking,
when he was fired it prevented him from utilizing effective coping mechanisms and prevented
him from “switching” across motivational states, leaving him unable to manage with the stress of
the personal crisis in a positive manner. To fill the void of the positive coping mechanisms,
Howard turned to defection as a way to handle his firing from the CIA.180 Therefore, the
difference in Howard’s reaction to the rejections is the result of the divergent circumstances
leading to differing motivating factors and perceived options moving forward.
A second aspect of Edward Howard’s motivation for defection to be evaluated are his
overt claims of disgruntlement. After his firing, many of Howard’s colleagues noted his anger
towards the CIA for their “mistreatment” and perceived injustices towards him.181 The claims of
Howard are neither unfounded nor rare. Katherine Herbig’s work concluded that a prominent
reason for defection within the intelligence community is disgruntlement with the employing
agency.182 However, her observations, without additional input from other authors, would merely
claim that disgruntlement was the primary reason for defection. This generalization leaves out
the critical factor of Howard’s ability to shift motivational states. Previously he was displeased
by his rejection from the CIA, yet did not turn to destructive behavior. Therefore, the inclusion
of the observations of reversal theory are imperative. Therefore, I assess that Howard defected to
the USSR because of disgruntlement arising from his personal crisis of being rejected (fired) by
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the CIA; set in the context of being an employee engaging in deviant behavior and drug usage
and an inability to cope with the triggering event, and thus unable to shift motivational states.
Numerous aspects of Howard’s case give rise to an assessment that the U.S. government
made three major failures when handling the case of Howard. The first is the failure to detect
Howard’s predisposition for defection in the first place. The CIA identified him as an “ideal”
candidate as an intelligence officer based on numerous qualifications such as having a graduate
degree, knowing three languages, and the possession of a security clearance (issued by
USAID).183 While “on paper” Howard was an ideal candidate, his questioning in the security
process, along with the questioning of his family, friends, and colleagues, demonstrated that he
was not forthcoming with his past history, specifically drug usage and deviant behavior, an
immediately disqualifying factor within the security clearance process. However, the failures of
the CIA’s ability to appropriately evaluate Howard’s past allowed him to made it through the
process, placing him in a role with access to classified information and operating procedures.
Once learning of Howard’s ineptitude of working for the CIA as an intelligence officer, through
conducting a polygraph prior to his deployment to the USSR, they fired him, leading to their
second failure in preventing his defection.
The second failure in preventing defection is the way in which the CIA handled the
dismissal of Howard. Prior to his firing, the CIA gave Howard multiple chances to work through
his drug usage, retake his polygraph tests, and sought to pay for his counseling services (months
after his separation from the agency),184 taking many precautions and steps to ensure a fair and
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dignified exit process for Howard. However, Howard perceived their actions, and his firing as
unjust and unwarranted. Regardless of the CIA’s attempts to establish a relatively amicable
separation moving forward, Howard’s perception of the events, whether true or not, led to his
disgruntlement with his former employer and ultimately his defection. The failure of the CIA in
the dismissal of Howard is not in the appropriate measures they took in the separation process,
but in their failure to take additional precautionary measure. One of the primary measures absent,
in the immediate aftermath of the firing, was the need to evaluate Howard’s mental status.185 If
the CIA were to have evaluated Howard’s mental status, they would have determined that he was
resentful and unable to cope with the separation, and would have either needed to detain him,
limit his foreign contact, or keep watch over his activities for a set period, to better protect the
classified information Howard left the CIA with. One tool at the disposal of the CIA that would
have enabled them to keep tabs on Howard’s activity, after he left the agency, is the use of the
FBI and their domestic law enforcement capabilities.
The third failure the CIA made was the failure to inform the FBI about their separation
with a potentially damaging former employee. If informed, the FBI would have been able to
keep watch over Howard and his activities for a period of time to verify that he was not seeking
to defect. A second advantage of notifying the FBI would have enabled them to build a stronger
case against Howard early on, enabling them to arrest him. The CIA did not reveal their
dismissal or concerns to the FBI about Howard until late 1985 upon receiving a USSR defector
that pointed to Howard as having defected to the USSR.186 Upon learning of his potential
defection, the FBI launched an investigation into Howard, forcing them to gather a significant
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amount of information on him in a short period of time to offset the last year and a half of
inaction in working against him. Howard, a trained CIA intelligence officer, noticing the
increased attention being paid to his activities tipped him off to the FBI investigation into his
defection.187 Upon recruiting his wife to evade further investigation and arrest, Howard planned
an escape using the tradecraft the CIA had taught him, which allowed him to lose his FBI
surveillance, leave the U.S., and make his way to the USSR, where he established himself as the
first CIA officer to publicly defect to the USSR.188
Edward Howard’s defection was the result of his predisposition to defect, a triggering
event (his firing), encumbered by an inability to shift motivational states, and failures of the CIA
to effectively combat defection. Without all of these components, Howard’s defection would not
have been possible. The initial failure in the investigation of Howard’s past granted him access to
classified information, which led to Howard’s dismissal when administered another polygraph,
revealing the inaccuracy of the previous investigation. The CIA then followed appropriate
protocol, attempting to dismiss Howard on the most amicable terms possible. However, Howard,
now armed with classified information and procedures and unable to cope with being rejected by
the CIA a second time, defected to the USSR because of the perceived injustices he felt at the
hands of the CIA. The CIA, failing to understand Howard’s true motivational and mental state,
did not inform additional agencies that could have helped keep tabs on Howard and his actions,
which allowed Howard to engage in his defection without scrutiny. The failures of the CIA set in
motion a chain of events that forced the FBI to expedite their investigation, tipping off a trained
CIA officer, allowing Howard to flee the U.S. and seek asylum in the USSR.
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Ana Montes
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the FBI arrested a top level Cuban analyst
working for the DIA, Ana Montes, as a result of an extensive investigation, revealing that she
had spent her career at the DIA as a “mole” for Cuba.189 After beginning a career at the DIA in
1985, Montes worked with Cuban intelligence officers as a defector, where in the following 16
years, until her arrest in September 2001, she became a leading expert within the U.S.
intelligence community on Cuba, influenced the U.S. government’s understanding of Cuba, and
compromised multiple intelligence officers working undercover in Cuba.190
Ana Montes was sought out by the Cuban intelligence service (G2), while she was
working for the Department of Justice (DOJ), where late 1984, she was recruited and defected to
Cuba, prior to her employment with the DIA.191 Like many of the past cases discussed, her
predisposition is seated in her past experiences. Beginning in Montes’s childhood, she was
surrounded by diversity and views that opposed U.S. policy. She was born in Germany, to a U.S.
army officer of Puerto Rican dissent, who was vocal of his support for Puerto Rican
independence from the U.S.; was raised throughout the U.S., moving frequently because of her
father’s job; and frequently traveled to Puerto Rico to visit family. 192 The Montes children, Ana
and her younger brother and sister, while members of a proud Puerto Rican family, were
prevented from speaking Spanish at home, yet Ana Montes was still successful in developing her
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Spanish-speaking abilities, eventually attaining a near-native level. She would go on to attend the
University of Virginia (UVA) for her undergraduate degree, studying abroad in Puerto Rico and
Spain, where she began to speak publicly about her disagreements with U.S. policy towards
Latin American countries (LAC).193 After graduating from UVA, she was offered a job working
for the DOJ, attained a Top Secret security clearance, and completed her master’s program at
John’s Hopkins University, all while continuing to publicly disagree with U.S. policy towards
LAC. Late 1984, while still working for the DOJ, Montes was pitched and recruited by the G2,194
beginning her life as a defector. Shortly after her recruitment, Montes was accepted to the DIA as
an analyst, where she would continue to work, and spy for the G2, for the next 16 years, until her
arrest in 2001.195
Montes was identified as a potential defector by the G2 based on her public objections to
U.S. LAC policy, however, her successful recruitment is explained by evaluating the interaction
of Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory (SLT) with the tools of MICE and RASCLS,
leading to the conclusion that she defected for ideological reasons. These observations are further
supported by the variables surrounding her continued actions against the U.S. and DIA. The first
component to Montes’s defection is her predisposition, where, from a young age, she was
encouraged to question and disagree with U.S. policy, the beginnings of her divergence with
U.S. ideology. Bandura’s SLT postulates that individuals learn by watching others and that the
individual is likely to emulate the behavior when closely identifying with the mimicked
individual.196 In the case of Ana Montes, she learned at a young age from her father, a prominent
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figure in her life, that questioning the policies of the U.S., specifically when dealing with LAC,
is a viable option. This lesson was internalized, and eventually materialized in college, when she
began to spend more time in foreign countries during study abroad semesters, and therefore, by
the time she was pitched in late 1984, Montes had a firm belief in her ability to question U.S.
policies. In identifying that Montes had multiple factors that would lead to a successful defector,
the G2 used the tools of MICE and RASCLS to recruit her.
The “I” in MICE stands for ideology, one of the foundational motivating factors that lead
an individual to act. While in this case, it is evident that Montes held ideological differences with
U.S. LAC policy, it is not clear that these differences alone would have led to her defection. The
fact that Montes did not seek out Cuban intelligence officials to defect is a critical variable in
assessing Montes’s willingness to defect on ideology alone. A second piece of evidence emerges
during an interview with the counterintelligence (CI) agent, that investigated her for espionage
activity later in her career, stating that disagreement does not necessarily mean disloyalty.197
While she was engaged in defection at the time of the statement, it brings to light that her
defection was the result of internal conflict between her ideological differences being influenced
by something more. This leads to the conclusion that Montes’s defection in unable to be
explained solely by a predisposed to ideological differences, demonstrated by SLT, and the
application of MICE.
The incomplete analysis of Montes’s motivation for defection by SLT and MICE,
requires the use of RASCLS to be used to lead to a full understanding of Montes’s transition
from ideological differences to defector. RASCLS focuses on the way in which an intelligence
officer is able to manipulate an individual’s potential predisposing factors, inciting them to
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defect.198 RASCLS involves establishing interpersonal relationships with assets and
manipulating those relationships to play to the assets’ predispositions. In the case of Ana Montes,
the G2 would have connected with Montes on the mutual agreement that U.S. involvement in the
LAC was hurting the countries; on Montes’s strong Puerto Rican heritage; and the use of
Spanish. Playing on these factors would have allowed the G2 to persuaded Montes that the best
way to help the LAC, and subsequently “her people”, was to defect to Cuba by spying on the
U.S. from within the DIA.199 Therefore, understanding Montes’ defection requires the use of
SLT, which demonstrates that she was predisposition to ideological differences, and that
acceptance that G2 used RASCLS to emboldened and exploited Montes predisposition. Absent
either of these factors would have potentially led Montes down a path of disagreement, not
disloyalty.
At the hands of the G2, Ana Montes’s ideological differences were manipulated, coercing
her defection. However, the U.S. government failed to identify her as a defector until an
investigation into her potential espionage activities beginning in 2000.200 The DIA had multiple
shortcomings when handling Ana Montes. The first was their insufficient in-processing
procedures. Unlike the CIA and NSA, at the time, the DIA did not use polygraph examinations
in determining the validity of an applicant’s claims during the adjudication process.201 Montes’s
security reviews consisted of in-person interviews and the interviewing of references, which
were later demonstrated to be riddled with inaccuracies. Throughout follow-up security
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interviews during her career, Montes revealed on multiple occasions that she had not been
completely truthful during her pre-employment screening.202 These continual revelations are the
second failure of the DIA, overlooking Montes’s lies by not further investigating the falsified
information, permitting her to maintain access to classified information. This failure, previously
discussed in the cases above is identified as the inherent flaw that human beings are given a
choice to act or not on the established procedures.
A final flaw can be identified as the agency’s reliance on their biases to understanding
defection and the way it is conducted. The first component of the failure due to biases is
evidenced in an investigation, early in Montes’s career, in response to reports from a coworker
that was concerned that she was a defector. Some of the accepted “red flags” that were absent,
preventing the investigator from further investigating, were: 1) She was not a male; 2) Her
financial situation remained unchanged; 3) She had already previously been investigated and
granted a TS/SCI security clearance; and the “trump card”, 4) She had passed a polygraph
examination in the course of the CI investigation.203 While these are all factors that have been
variables in the defection of individuals in the past and must be taken into consideration when
evaluating a case for the potential for defection, the DIA’s overreliance on them hindered its
ability to identify Montes as a defector earlier in her career. The second bias present was the
DIA’s understanding of the way that an individual collected classified information to be
disseminated to their country of defection. All the previous cases analyzed saw the defector
retrieve information from their work, remove it from the facility, and then transfer it to their
handlers. Montes’s defection proved unique because she never removed information from the
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building, instead, she memorized it, upon returning home, typed it up on her home computer, and
then transferred it to her handlers.204 This process allowed her to disseminate classified
information without ever having the possibility of being caught “red handed” until the point she
would type it up in the privacy of her home, allowing her to remain undetected for 16 years.
A final conclusion to be drawn from the U.S. government’s biases leads to a deeper
conversation that is highlighted by the overall case of Ana Montes. Montes’s defection was
characterized by novelty, an ability to evade detection, and an ability to effectively live a double
life, critical skills for an intelligence officer when operating against other countries, but
incredibly dangerous to one’s home country. This dilemma, posed by training highly skilled and
intelligent individuals in the art of deception and manipulation, is an inseparable part of running
an effective intelligence agency. Without trained and skilled individuals, an intelligence agency
would be unable to collect information on targets, thus making them irrelevant; therefore, by
creating a strong intelligence agency, with highly skilled and intelligence officers, a government
is sowing the seeds to its own destruction.
By incorporating theoretical understanding of motivation and research directed at
motivation for defection, an evaluation of the case of Ana Montes’s defection demonstrated that
she was raised to questions U.S. foreign policy at a young age, which predisposed her to
ideological divergence with the U.S. Throughout her college years, becoming more vocal about
these differences, broadcast her potential to defect along ideological lines to the G2. Montes’
differences were soon exploited by the G2’s use of RASCLS. However, the U.S. government
failed to adequately prevent a potential defector from accessing classified information, and
would later allow their biases to prevent them detecting the defection for 16 years. In concluding,
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the case of Montes seeks to communicates a paradox that exists today in that it is necessary to
train skilled and intelligent individuals to build and operate effective intelligence agencies, yet in
doing so, states are sowing seeds that could lead to their own destruction, if those individuals are
turned against the state.

Aldrich Ames
The final case investigated in this section is the case of Aldrich Ames, who many deem
as the most damaging spy in U.S. history.205 Ames, was a CIA officer working with the CIA’s
counter intelligence unit focusing on countering Soviet (and later Russian) intelligence
operations, handling cases of Soviet defectors, and the running of operations that required critical
insights into Soviet assets. In 1985, 18 years after he started his career at the CIA, Ames began
spying on the U.S. for the USSR and Russia by selling the identity of numerous intelligence
assets, which led to many of their executions; various CIA methods of tracking USSR agents and
officers; and CIA methods for handling and communicating with assets inside the “denied”
USSR.206 Ames was eventually arrested in 1994, nine years after his defection began where he
was paid $2.7 million by the USSR, the highest paid U.S. spy to date.207
The first aspect of the case of Aldrich Ames’ defection that contributes to an
understanding of his motivation for defection is the role that an individual’s disordered
personality traits play in predisposing an individual to defection. Past research and conclusions
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have already been discussed and evaluated in the previous cases of John Walker, Robert
Hanssen, and Edward Howard, demonstrating this as defining component of motivation for
defection. In the case of Ames, his predisposed personality is evident through the critical
example of his deviant behavior. Ames, like all other CIA employees took a polygraph as a
precondition for employment, where he confessed that he engaged in sub-threshold alcoholic
behavior and criminal behavior to include stealing a bicycle.208 While Ames’ alcohol abuse
demonstrated a prevalence of disordered personality traits, his breaking of policies and
regulations built upon further highlight this initial observation. With the disordered behaviors of
alcohol abuse and thievery admitted to the CIA, and overlooked to allow Ames to continue his
employment, his deviant behavior became more significant throughout his career, taking the
form of continued (and worsening) alcohol abuse and failing to abide by CIA policies and
regulations. One of the various rules broken by Ames was the need to divulge a change in
relationship status, especially when the relationship involves someone of foreign nationality.
Beginning in 1981, Ames and his wife, an American, began to experience marital
troubles and were divorced in 1985.209 However, during this time, Ames, working in Mexico,
had recruited an agent, named Maridel Rosario Casas Dupuy (Rosario) and began an intimate
relationship with her all without the CIA’s knowledge, a security violation.210 Approximately a
month after his divorce and prolonged relationship with Rosario, Ames informed he CIA of his
current intimate relationship status, marrying Rosario. With this security violation behind him,
Ames would go on to violate another CIA policy by opening significant lines of credit that he
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was unable to pay back.211 The noted behavior of Ames’ overextension of his credit line plays a
significant role in his motivation on two fronts, financial incentives (in and of themselves) and
divergent loyalties. The significance of the debt that Ames faced cannot be understated leads an
individual to seek out a means to satisfy their financial requirements. In Aldrich Ames’ case, his
financial needs helped drive him to walk into the Soviet embassy in April of 1985 and defect to
the USSR, by supplying them with the names of Soviet assets run by the CIA, in return for
$50,000.212 He would continue to be paid immense sums of money in the form of cash and
credit, in an off-shore account, in return for his activities.
Ames’ alcoholism, breaking of security protocol, and selling of U.S. secrets, while all
deviant behavior, are on a spectrum of severity, with the selling of U.S. secrets being the most
severe. This observation brings forward the question of, all other factors being constant, how can
one’s deviant behavior escalate from something relatively minor to an extreme of selling state
secrets? One explanation is that Ames had an underdeveloped personality that prevented him
from coping with the stresses of the financial hardships, leading him to turn to increasingly more
deviant behavior, and ultimately defection. However, the viability of this proposition is called
into question because of Ames’ ability to effectively navigate situations of varying stress levels
and difficult situations, exemplified throughout his first 18 years as a CIA intelligence officer.
A second explanation stems from Ames’ divergent loyalties. Many authors claim that
Ames’ motives were strictly financial,213 however, the motivation that led to his financial
situation is a motivating factor in itself. Ames’ deviant behavior of overextension of his credit
lines and his compromised financial situation emerged from his divorce and relationship with
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Rosario. The divorce from his ex-wife left him with a set of payments to satisfy; however, his
divorce ran concurrently his expanding relationship with Rosario that had evolved to marriage,
leading her to move to Washington D.C. with him and live the lavish lifestyle Ames had implied
that he could provide her.214 As a result of Rosario being misled about his true financial situation,
Ames’ was unable to keep up with the new expenses, and instead of limiting the expenses and
divulging his true situation, Ames sought to appease Rosario by financially overextending
himself. Following the cause of the financial problem that influenced Ames actions,
demonstrates that the financial incentive to defect was in fact a symptom of divergent loyalties
between his commitment to the CIA, and the national security of the U.S., and his desire to
appease Rosario. Like the previous case of Ana Montes, Ames chose to remain loyal to a cause
other than the U.S.
Unlike the case of Ana Montes, Ames’ divergent loyalties are unable to fully explain
Ames’ motivation for defection. It fails to answer the questions of why he continued to engage in
increasingly more deviant behavior, from alcoholism and minor thievery to defection; why he
did not simply abandon his lies to Rosario in the face of increasingly more difficult financial
situations, when he had proven himself to effectively navigate difficult situations before; and
why he continued to engage in increasingly more dangerous espionage activities in support of the
USSR. These questions, unable to be answered by previous conclusions of the motivating factors
of financial motivation, personality disorders, or divergent loyalties, can be explained by an
incorporation and application of the ideas of SOEC.
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SOEC is the analysis that the more that an individual has invested in a situation (or
outcome) the more likely that individual is to increasingly invest in it.215 This leads to the
expectation that once an individual has ventured on a path, they will maintain that path,
destructive or not, until something removes them from their course of action. In the case of
Ames, an individual with a complex set of motivating behaviors, SOEC illuminates the gap
between the deviant behavior, divergent loyalties, and his defection. Beginning with his minor
thievery Ames had set himself up to continue his deviant behavior by failing to fully disclosing
the nature of his alcohol abuse on a polygraph to the CIA. He speculated that if he had revealed
the full extent of his behavior, he would be denied employment, and therefore lied. The second
scenario that SOEC explains the continued decent of Ames involves his time in Mexico. Once in
Mexico, Ames began “running” and developed an intimate relationship with Rosario, the agent.
This relationship began under the pretexts of Ames’ lavish lifestyle he was able to provide an
informant, however, once their intimate relationship began, Ames was unable to reveal his true
financial status. Once married, an inability to deviate from the path of lies that he had chosen to
keep telling Rosario, led him to seek out lines of credit that he was unable to maintain.
Therefore, at this point, SOEC helps explain Ames’ descent from a mediocre employee with
deviant tendencies,216 to an individual that was on an increasingly exacerbated path between the
truth and deviance. This path led Ames to have a stake in keeping Rosario financially appeased,
yet without money. He simultaneously became more deviant throughout his career as a CIA
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officer, from minor thievery, to drug abuse, to breaking security protocol. His early career saw
his descent on an individual level, personal level (at home), and professional level (with the
CIA). This continual path of deviance and lies, coupled with an innate instinct to obtain the basic
necessities of life (he would fail to have if he wasn’t able to pay back his overextended credit),
led Ames to assume that the only logical next step was defection.
While SOEC helps explain the interconnectivity between the increasingly deviant
behaviors, the role that divergent loyalty (between Rosario and the CIA), and his financial
struggles contributed to his defection, SOEC alongside the understanding of current legislation
and policy provides a viable explanation for his continued defection. As soon as Ames offered
information to the USSR, he committed a felony. U.S. law deems it illegal to pass any kind of
classified information to “unauthorized persons”, resulting in a harsh prison sentence if
convicted.217 While the U.S. judicial system allows prosecution discrepancy when bring a case
forward, there is little that an individual could do to avoid a prison term, and thus begins another
cycle of SOEC. At the point of his defection, Ames was presented with three primary options: 1)
Stop spying and continue with his life as normal; 2) Tell the CIA, take the punishment, and hope
for leniency; or 3) Continue to spy. Absent additional variables, the first two options seem viable
options. However, three primary considerations must be taken into account. The first is that
Ames has already begun down a path of deviance, lies, and loyalty to Rosario. A confession
would lead to the loss of his job, freedom, and his family, making this an unviable option. A
second consideration that must be taken into account is the nature of information that Ames gave
the Soviets. He delivered the names of agents that the CIA was running in the USSR. This

217

Cornell Law School, “18 U.S. Code § 798. Disclosure of classified information,” Legal
Information Institute, accessed August 17, 2019,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/798.

81
information, extremely valuable to the USSR and detrimental to CIA operations, would prove
fatal to many of those on the list.218 The execution of the individuals on the list would pose a
problem to Ames, because it would raise flags with the CIA, alerting to a potential compromise
within the agency. The internal hunt for a mole would make going about life “as usual” and
forgetting about the defection activity unlikely.
The final consideration that must be taken into account when determining whether Ames
would continue his defection activity or not is that fact that he had already sold secrets, and
therefore individuals within the USSR would be able to oust him as a spy. This is a critical
component on two fronts. First, if he stopped selling secrets, the USSR would have no incentive
to protect his identity from his initial compromise of the CIA. The second is that, if Ames’
continued to spy for the USSR he would be able to point the USSR in the direction of individuals
that had defected to the U.S. (from the USSR) that could lead to the uncovering of his defection.
The combination of the three considerations when choosing his next steps would have led Ames
to choose the option to keep spying for the USSR, and thus fulfill the need to continue to invest
more heavily into his defection.
This thorough investigation of the defection of Aldrich Ames leads to the conclusion that
his defection was the result of divergent loyalties, that resulted in his financial overextension,
and subsequent need for financial assistance. Aiding in furthering an understanding of Ames’
actions is the theoretical framework SOEC, which provides valuable insight into the way in
which his actions deteriorated from minor deviant behavior to something as extreme as
defection. SOEC also helps explain why, once Ames was able to pacify the financial motivating
factor, he would continue his defection. In all, an analysis of the case of Ames, while supporting
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the observations of those focusing their research on motivation for defection, is incomplete
without the incorporation of a theoretical framework from which to understand his financial need
and his defection activity.
The previous chapter analyzed the cases of defection of John Walker, Robert Hanssen,
Edward Howard, Ana Montes, and Aldrich Ames to demonstrate the successes and failures of
previous research in determining motivation for defection among individual in the intelligence
community; the successes and failures of current governmental efforts in combating defection
within the intelligence community; and to discuss whether alternatives to the chosen approaches
posed any more viable in being able to determine or prevent the defection of a given case.
While a complete analysis will be presented in Chapter 5, there are a few observations
worth noting in the conclusion of this chapter. First, the predominant motivating factors that led
to defection, in the identified cases were: an individual’s predisposition to react negatively to a
stressful situation, an inclination to engage in deviant behavior, or sub-threshold personality
defects; divergent loyalties, whether to another country or separate cause; discontent with the
agency they were working for; and the inclusion of financial incentives. Secondly, observations
from those focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence community were able to
effectively “classify” an individual’s motivation into a general category, however, the use of a
theoretical framework was required to truly understanding what motivated an individual to
defect. Additionally, as a result of defection research’s reliance on motivational theory posed by
psychologists, sociologists, and social psychologists, understanding the motivation of an
individual required hindsight and applying of a theory to the defection, as opposed to attempting
to explain a defection via theory. In all, these critiques, expanded upon later, highlight the
difficulty that the U.S. government has in developing policies to prevent and detect defection,
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when those studying defection are unable to assess motivation without hindsight or a theoretical
evaluation of what motivates an individual to defect.

84
CHAPTER 5
A CRITIQUE, THE INEVITABLE, AND A WAY FORWARD
In this chapter, I bring together the previously presented research, in light of applying it
to five cases of defection. I first pose a critique of the current approaches taken towards studying
motivation for defection within the intelligence community. Secondly, this chapter focuses on
the ways theoretical and directed research on motivation have influenced and directed the
government’s ability to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community. Thirdly,
I highlight the numerous factors that will continue to influence assessing an individual’s
motivation to defect and the ability to combat that defection. Finally, this chapter concludes with
an assessment of how to move forward to better evaluate motivation for defection within the
intelligence community, which would provide a more effective strategy to combat defection, and
propositions for the future direction of motivational studies directed at analyzing defection
within the intelligence community.

The Study of Motivation for Defection Within the Intelligence Community
The previous work on motivation, discussed at length in Chapter 3, began with an
analysis of the theoretical development on the factors surround motivation. The study of the
reason for an individual’s actions stemmed from a curiosity to better understand the “why”,
which eventually saw the fields of psychological and sociological evolve concurrently.
Psychologists’ view on motivation continually changed and expanded based on ever-developing
technological advances and understandings of the workings of an individual and their cognitive
processes. Sociologists adapted their theories based on the confirmation or refutation of their
previous conclusions, the changing dynamics in society, and the differences in social or cultural
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values. Eventually both fields have acknowledged the importance that both, the cognitive
processes of an individual and the environmental conditions, play in defining an individual’s
motivation, leading to the predominance of social psychology as the forerunner in motivational
studies.
This theoretical foundation, laid out by social psychologists, dictated to those who have
focused on the question of, “What motivates an individual, within the intelligence community, to
defect?”, the role that internal and external processes play in motivating an individual. In
response, their research, focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence community,
effectively established generalized categories of motivators that lead to defection, such as:
personality disposition, money, divergent loyalties, and disgruntlement. However, while their
research proved to be an effective tool to leverage an individual’s potential predisposition and
help explain an individual’s motivation, it was ineffective in demonstrating the underlying
causes and motivators of their defection. This observation leads to two primary critiques.
The first critique is that the simplification of motivation to financially motivated,
divergent loyalties, personality predisposition, or disgruntlement, leads to an inability to truly
understand an individual’s motivation to defect. The categories mentioned above are broad and
can include a number of underlying motivations that ultimately lead to the conclusion of the allencompassing “category” provided by the tool. Multiple examples of underlying motivations
were demonstrated in Chapter 4, and include, an individual seeking money to fulfill financial
obligations, such as paying off a debt; increasing one’s social status among their friends, family,
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and or peers;219 or the perception that getting paid was a sign of respect.220 The examples
provided in Chapter 4, and briefly recapped here, demonstrate the variety of factors that could
lead an individual to be categorized as having a financially motivated defection, highlighting
how the simplification of an individual’s motivation to one word, such as money, is inadequate
to describe the complexity of motivational factors that compel an individual to act.
A second, and more profound, critique is the lack of theoretical development taking place
within the evolution of the study of motivation for defection. This is evident when looking to the
evolution of the study of motivation put forward by the fields of psychology, sociology, and
social psychology compared to the evolution of research directed at defection. The developments
within the theoretical fields were brought about by conflicting ideas that had to demonstrate that
previous observations were inadequate and that the new perspective more accurately described
motivation, following a process outlined in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions.221 While the directed research for the study of motivation for defection within the
intelligence community is informed by the theoretical developments of social psychology, it fails
to follow a similar evolutionary tradgectory. This failure to evolve has left the directed research
absent a theoretical foundation, evidenced in Katherine Herbig’s big-data analytical approach,
which provides the reader with a vast amount of information merely communicates the ways in
which an individual’s defection is classified (money, ideology, etc.).222 It does not lend to
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predictions of why the selected individuals that defected did, while others, who were confronted
with similar situations, did not.
This lack of theoretical development is also seen in the proposal of the tool of MICE.
When looking to this tool, practitioners identify that these are five common themes that can
potentially lead an individual to defect. However, it is unable to determine an individual’s true
motivation, as previously seen in the example of financial motivation. This lends to an inability
to effectively determine if the motivation being leveraged by the intelligence officer is actually
acting upon an individual’s motivation to defect or a “symptom” of an individual’s true
motivation. A final component to emphasize the lack of theoretical development in the directed
research is Allen Dulles describing the running of spies as an art.223 Therefore the use of the
conclusions drawn by researchers is a means to help the “artists” (intelligence officer) complete
their job of recruiting agents. This statement by Dulles shows that those looking into motivation
for defection within the intelligence community are not seeking answers to an individual’s
motivation to defect, but are seeking to provide intelligence officers with the most streamlined
knowledge to most effectively convince an individual to defect.
By tailoring their work to aid in the recruitment of agents, and not for the deeper
understanding of the motivation of the defector, those studying motivation for defection within
the intelligence community have reduced the complex phenomena of motivation to simplistic
categories that were only able to provide an analysis of general symptoms of an individual’s true
motivations. These categories failed to advance an understanding of motivation when applied in
Chapter 4, necessitating the use of various theoretical perspectives to further understand the case
at hand. Ultimately, the conclusions of this section lead to the assessment that those currently
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studying motivation of defection are not looking at motivation for defection, but at how to
provide intelligence officers a framework and basic outline of potential predispositions of an
individual that could be leveraged to coerce defection. Frameworks and tools, that as previously
demonstrated, are ineffective in determining an individual’s true motivation, even with the
benefit of hindsight.

Research Guiding Governmental Efforts to Prevent and Detect Defection
One key role of the intelligence community, continually noted throughout the work, is the
protection of national and international security, as well as the protection of one’s own secrets.
To protect the U.S.’ information from being exploited via intelligence officers from foreign
countries, the U.S. government has implemented a number of programs and procedures to
prevent and detect defection by acting across the 3 phases of an individual’s career: preemployment, employment, and post-employment. While the true effectiveness of these
procedures will never be truly known because of the classification of the information and the
overall inability to know how many people have actually defected, unclassified evidence provide
insight that at least some of the steps taken by the U.S. government have been effective in
mitigating defection.
One area where U.S. government employs a significant amount of resources to counter
defection is in their pre-employment procedure. The adjudication process is centered on
preventing individuals with a predisposition from accessing classified information by requiring
an individual to obtain a security clearance through a rigorous verification process. Ursula
Wilder iterates that this is a critical component because, without access to information, an

89
individual is unable to defect.224 A second aspect influencing the government’s anti-defection
measures result from the conclusion, drawn by directed research on motivation for defection, that
money, divergent loyalties, and personality predisposition are the primary contributing factors
that contribute to an individual’s defection.225 In attempting to counter these factors, the
government has developed and implemented programs during an individual’s employment and
post-employment, which focus on fostering a deeper connection, and loyalty, to one’s
community (both the intelligence community and the community they live in); financial
assistance through programs such as tuition reimbursement; and the suppression of the
dissemination of classified information. While many of these programs seek to create a “winwin” situation, the government is willing to take extraordinary measures to protect its national
interests.226
In all, the U.S. government has developed plans of action and mitigation techniques,
drawn from the conclusions those researching motivation for defection within the intelligence
community, in enacting policies and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting defection
within the intelligence community. However, as previously assessed, those that have been
directing their research on motivation for defection within the intelligence community have
actually been evaluating broad frameworks and a basic outline of potential aspects of an
individual’s motivational predisposition that could be leveraged to coerce defection. Therefore,
while the government’s policies have been informed by research, their actions, like those
conducting directed research, is limited to the superficial components of an individual’s
motivation. This problem of superficial fixation fails to account for more complex motivational
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states that the previous case studies revealed. One egregious example of this is outlined in the
case study of Aldrich Ames. In the case of Ames, his true motivation can be traced back to
personality predisposition and his divergent loyalties; however, many continue to see his
motivation as primarily financially motivated because of a fixation on the “symptoms” of his true
motivation.
Two primary critiques of the current actions taken by the government stem from this
inability to accommodate conclusions beyond the research focusing on defection. The first
critique lies in the understanding that research directed at motivation for defection reduces
motivation to five categories, such as in MICE, and any new underlying motivational conditions
will continue to fall under the established categories. The government, using the directed
research as a guide to inform their defection prevention policies, is now unable to develop
beyond existing policies because they see no change in what leads an individual to defect,
leaving governmental policies unable to adjust to changing motivational trends, forcing them to
maintain their current policies, which may or may not be the most effective option available.
A second critique is an inability for the government to head off defection before it begins.
This inability is systemic due to two primary factors. The first is that, the government, relying on
the five categories to inform them of who is at risk of defecting, focuses their search on
individuals exhibiting the factors outlined in the categories. This fixation allows those that have
motivational ambitions to defect, not yet superficially evident, to continue to become
increasingly more prone to defect. This is evident in the case of Aldrich Ames, where the
argument can be made that, if Ames’ predisposition was head off earlier in his career cycle, he
may have been either apprehended or prevented from defection in the first place. However, since
the complexity of Ames’ case was outside the scope of the government’s understanding, his
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deviant behavior progressed from mere theft to defection, due to aggravating factors, and
continued, for nine years, until his superficial motivations came to the attention of the CIA. A
second factor hindering the governments predictive ability, is a lack of theoretical structure
proposed by those researching motivation for defection. Their failure leads to multiple
observations, yet provides little insight into the way in which “financial motivations” interact
with other components of an individual’s life to lead to defection.
Therefore, the government, while unable to stop all defections, has taken actions to
prevent and detect defection informed by research by establishing pre-employment procedures
and programs during and post-employment to counter the conclusions drawn by research
directed at motivation for defection within the intelligence community. However, this focus has
left the government unable to understand the complexity of motivation for defection, and thus an
individual’s true motivations, leaving the government fixated on preventing and detecting
defection among those with superficial symptoms. In all, while the true extent of all defection
will never be known, for a variety of reasons, the government has clearly taken actions to prevent
defection, based upon their own understanding, yet, are left exposed due to their limited
understanding of motivation for defection and a lack of theoretical framework from which to
evaluate defection.

The Pervasive and Inevitable Problems
One key theme throughout the research presented has been the idea of uncertainty.
Beginning with the uncertainty surrounding international relations, to the uncertainty of
intelligence, leading to an understanding of uncertainty in determining an individual’s
motivations. While this section also presents inescapable uncertainty, I also present four
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omnipresent components that will always lead to difficulty when studying motivation for
defection and implementing government policies directed at preventing or detecting defection
within the intelligence community.
The first aspect that must be addressed is the difficulty in understanding the true
motivations of individuals working within the intelligence community. This difficulty emanates
from a government’s desire to heavily invests in the formal and professional education and
abilities of its officers to be able to outmaneuver other states’ intelligence agencies. Therefore,
the problem in evaluating motivation for defection, and preventing and detecting defection,
within the intelligence community is that you are working against officers that have been trained
to be the best in deception and manipulation. Ultimately, in the act of defection within the
intelligence community, the tools of deception and manipulation that have been honed to
outmaneuver rivals is turned against the state, presenting the inescapable conundrum of the better
a government makes their intelligence professionals, the more damage they can do themselves.
The second component that must be understood is that, no matter how true the
government’s understanding of motivation for defection or how perfect their policies of
prevention and detection, to implement effective policies and actions to combat defection there
needs to be intimate intergovernmental coordination. This difficulty is evident in the previous
analyses of John Walker and Edward Howard, where, with more intergovernmental coordination,
the effects of their defections could have been recognized sooner and the effects of their
defection, mitigated. The pervasive nature of this component is that there will always be a finite
amount of resources allocated from the U.S. government and the agencies will always be vying
for as much of those resources, leading to a zero-sum game and encouraging them to do things
“in house”. While interagency is still a point of contention, the U.S. government has taken active
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steps to encourage increased cooperation through efforts, such as the creation of interagency task
forces.227
The third pervasive aspect that garners attention, is the fact that, even if the U.S.
government truly understood motivation for defection perfectly and was able to implement it
perfectly through interagency cooperation, those upholding the policies are human beings with
the choice to either abide by the policies set forward or not. This observation stems from
evidence supported by various cases, where, according to documented policy, an individual
should have been reprimanded, penalized, or even fired, yet was not because their transgressions
were overlooked.
A final component to take into consideration when evaluating an individual’s motivation
for defection prevention and detection, is that throughout every aspect of the process of creating
and implementing policy and safeguards, human beings play an inescapable role. People are
shaped by an infinite number of psychological and environmental factors that influence their
decision-making. Throughout any given day they are presented with an absorbent amount of
choices to make ranging from something as simple as whether they are going to brush their teeth
to something as monumental as quitting a job. Therefore, throughout the process of attempting to
evaluate an individual’s motivation for defection, there must be recognition of the abundance of
factors that contribute to an individual’s motivation. However, it also effects whether an
individual is willing to act on the policies designed to prevent and detect the defection of others
in the community. Ultimately, the human “factor” that must be taken into account when
evaluating motivation for defection within the intelligence community must also be considered
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when developing and implementing policies to prevent and detect defection within the
intelligence community, leading to a perpetual sense of uncertainty.

A Way Forward
In response to my critiques of the way in which those studying motivation for defection
have failed in assisting in the government’s ability to prevent and detect defection, I bring
forward two proposals to address the previous shortcomings. My proposals seek to provide a
way forward within the study of motivation for defection while also providing recommendations
for increased governmental efforts aimed at preventing and detecting defection.
The first proposal is in the need to develop the field of defection studies based on
discovering the motivation for defection, not the situation that was leveraged to encouraged the
individual to defect. The divergence of the two is that the “situation” can be described as the
“last straw” or the most readily identifiable aspect that led to the defection, while the motivation
is the true underlying causes of the defection, which may or may not coincide with the situation
that led to the defection. A second recommendation is for the direct inclusion of academic work
into defection studies. Much of the work focusing on defection stemmed either from practitioners
within the intelligence community or from the government. I’m not implying that those focused
on this topic are intentionally biased, but that there are inherent differences in an individual’s
perspective on a situation, shaped by their life experiences, and that the foundation set forward
by practitioners would be better suited if aided by the work of academics. A final
recommendation for the study of motivation for defection within the intelligence community is
to establish a framework from which they make their observations before attempting to draw
conclusions. Developing and utilizing a theoretical framework effectively narrows down the
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questions a field of study seeks to answer, 228 and its establishment would provide a standard way
to evaluate previous and future cases of defection. In summation, before moving to make
practical suggestions within the intelligence community, those evaluating motivation for
defection within the intelligence community need to focus on establishing a theoretical basis
aimed at determining an individual’s motivation for defection. This enhancement of the field of
study as a whole will translate to enhanced practical capabilities, such as developing improved
tools for intelligence officers and would prove more valuable for policy makers by identifying
root motivational causes for defection.
The second recommendation to better prevent and detect defection, in regards to
government policy and procedures, is multipronged. The first aspect is the need for the
government to have a more thorough understanding of motivation and the role it plays in an
individual’s defection. To meet this requirement, those studying motivation for defection must
make the necessary changes previously described. However, the research will only be able to be
conducted if the government fulfills its obligation to supply the necessary funding towards, and
prioritization of, establishing a better understanding of defection. A second recommendation for
change is increased communication within the intelligence community. It was markedly noted,
through the case studies that the intelligence agencies have increased cross-agency
communication throughout the years. However, when information is time sensitive continued
integration would only further benefit the efforts to prevent and detect defection. A third
proposal is for the intelligence community to increase community integration. Current efforts by
agencies include post-employment community building opportunities; however, efforts taken by
the government to inform, and therefore more closely align, the larger public with the
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intelligence community, would serve two purposes. The first would be that those coming on as
an intelligence officer would already have a sense of identification with the intelligence
community, allowing for a deeper ideological integration. While a second consideration would
be the intelligence community’s reciprocation of a feeling of alignment with the community they
are serving. A final proposal for actions to be taken, or continued, by the government to better
prevent and detect defection, is the promotion of the values of the intelligence community. Many
specific values include rule adherence, upholding one’s obligation, and instilling a sense of duty
to one’s country. This effort would be two-pronged in its efforts to prevent defection. First, it
would enhance social bonds, a proven factor to mitigate deviant behavior. A second benefit
would be that the inherently unpredictability of whether an individual would uphold the
standards and policies, would be decreased because of the communal pressures and obligations
that one would have to uphold those duties and obligations.
Throughout this chapter, I presented a critique, that those focusing on motivation for
defection within the intelligence community oversimplified an explanation of motivation into
five categories, which lead to a myriad of difficulties. The primary deficiency was in a lack of
theoretical framework, which, in efforts to fully inform the government on motivation for
defection, failed to determine an individual’s motivation for defection. This failure led to the
U.S. government to lack an exhaustive understanding of the complexities of factors motivating
defection. However, I also acknowledge that those studying motivation for defection, and the
government, will have to continually confront a variety of pervasive factors stemming from an
individual’s free will and unpredictable nature. I conclude by proposing various ways to rectify
the deficiencies in defection studies while also proposing ways the government can move
forward in their efforts to better prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
One primary theme throughout international relations has been uncertainty. Many states
have sought to mitigate this through the use of intelligence agencies. It is at this junction that my
work begins. In identifying HUMINT as a critical component in rectifying these uncertainties, I
sought to answer the question, does current research on motivation for defection adequately
inform government procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence
community? In my efforts to answer this question, I address the role that motivation has in the
intelligence community; how motivation has previously been discussed; and how individuals
have applied motivational studies to defection. After establishing an understanding of what
motivates an individual to defect, I applied these lessons to five case studies.
The application of the previous research demonstrated a variety of reasons an individual
would defect, including an individual’s predisposition to react negatively to a stressful situation,
an inclination to engage in deviant behavior, or sub-threshold personality defects; divergent
loyalties; discontent with the agency they were working for; and or financial incentives.
However, in analyzing motivation for defection in the case studies demonstrated several
deficiencies in the work of those focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence
community. Ultimately, this study demonstrated that their work focused not on motivation, but
on how to leverage an individual’s predispositions and direct them towards defection. This
fixation set off a series of irreconcilable deficiencies, with the primary one being a lack of
established theoretical framework. This hindered the assessment of past cases, requiring the use
of various theoretical applications to justify an assessment of what motivated an individual to
defect.
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The lack of a theoretical framework, in turn, has led to an incomplete understanding of
what motivates an individual to defect. Therefore, I assess that current research on motivation for
defection within the intelligence community does not adequately inform government policy and
procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community.
In light of this claim, I propose a two-pronged approach to move forward in better
preventing and detecting defection within the intelligence community. The first component is for
the government to increase inter-agency cooperation, in combination with bolstering funds for
the programs that are already in place to deter individuals from defecting. The second component
is for the government to allocate sufficient capital (financial and political) to those studying
motivation for defection, to: 1) Shift their study from developing tools for intelligence officers,
to studying motivation for defection and 2) Develop a theoretical framework from which to
understand defection within the intelligence community.
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